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[L]egislators cannot invent too many devices for subdividing
property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand
with the natural affections of the human mind.
—Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 17851
I. INTRODUCTION
If your house and fields are worth more separately, divide them; if you
want to leave a ring to your child now and grandchild later, split the
ownership in a trust. The American law of property encourages owners to
subdivide resources freely. Hidden within the law, however, is a boundary
principle that limits the right to subdivide private property into wasteful
fragments. While people often create wealth when they break up and
recombine property in novel ways, owners may make mistakes, or their
self-interest may clash with social welfare. Property law responds with
diverse doctrines that prevent and abolish excessive fragmentation and keep
resources well-scaled for productive use.2 Recently, however, the Supreme
Court has begun assigning a private property label to an increasing range of
fragments.3 By protecting too many fragments, the Court paradoxically
undermines the usefulness of private property as an economic institution
and constitutional category.4
The danger with fragmentation is that it may operate as a one-way
ratchet: Because of high transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and
cognitive biases, people may find it easier to divide property than to
1. 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
2. This Article focuses on resources usually exchanged through markets, rather than on
resources such as human bodies or political votes, for which commodification is even more
contested or rejected. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 (1985) (“ [S]ome forms of inalienability . . . have valid
public policy justifications in a democratic market society.” ). See generally Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (developing an anti-commodification
theory).
3. See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1934 (1998) (holding that
interest accrued in a lawyer’s trust account is the client’s property, even though the amount
involved is so small as to have no net economic value to the client); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 717 (1987) (holding the “ right to devise”  low-value fractionated Native American allotted
lands to be private property); see also Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999) (challenging the Court’s
approach in Phillips and Hodel).
4. Promoting efficient market exchange is not the only purpose of any property rights system
or of takings jurisprudence. Justificatory debates always lurk in the background of property
analysis, but they fall outside the explicit focus of this Article. See, e.g., Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at
1933 (noting the Court’s “ longstanding recognition that property is more than economic value” );
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988) (exploring justifications for
private property).
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recombine it.5 If too many people gain rights to use or exclude,6 then
bargaining among owners may break down. With too many owners of
property fragments, resources become prone to waste either through
overuse in a commons7 or through underuse in an anticommons.8 In well-
functioning property regimes, legislatures and courts prevent such waste by
drawing boundaries that constrain owners’ choices about fragmentation.
Outside the boundaries are commons and anticommons property; inside are
forms of private property. I intend the “ boundary principle”  to refer to the
legal doctrines that separate these property categories from each other and
help to keep resources well-scaled for productive use.
The boundaries among different ownership forms can be usefully
understood with reference to Figure 1. The thick vertical lines in Figure 1
represent the range of private property forms available in a well-functioning
society at any given time.9 Outside one boundary, in an open-access
commons, many people own valuable rights to use a resource, such as
fishing the ocean or polluting the air. Property law has traditionally treated
these rights as non-private property and abolished them without
compensation when necessary to overcome a tragedy of the commons.
Outside of the other boundary, in a full-exclusion anticommons, many
people own valuable rights to exclude others from a resource.10 Paralleling
the commons example, property law may also view such rights to exclude
5. The market failure problem is asymmetric. If a government allows too little fragmentation,
then fixing public policy may be enough: Owners can subdivide property through market
exchanges. However, once a government allows too much fragmentation, bargaining failures may
prevent market consolidation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing
that mistakes in biomedical patent policy may create too many fragmented rights and result in too
few life-saving innovations).
6. This Article will follow the colloquial usage of “ rights to use”  and “ rights to exclude.”
The Hohfeldian privilege/right terminology is more precise but obtuse. It offers little additional
analytical traction in this context. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 96-97 (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
7. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968)
(introducing the metaphor of the “ tragedy” ).
8. Anticommons property is most easily understood as the mirror image of commons
property. Readers unfamiliar with the idea of the anticommons should skip ahead to Section III.B
for a brief introduction or see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-25 (1998), which introduces
the anticommons as a new tool for property theory. See also id. at 667-68 (tracing the
anticommons idea to Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, in
NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3 (1982)).
9. The contours of these ownership forms shift subtly with legal, social, and technological
changes. Changes in formal law and informal institutions interact in unpredictable ways to affect
property boundaries. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the
connections between formal law and informal norms among diamond merchants).
10. A full-exclusion anticommons occurs relatively infrequently in mature property rights
systems. See Heller, supra note 8, at 667-69. The category of limited-exclusion anticommons
property provides more salient examples.
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as non-private and abolish them without compensation when necessary to
avoid an anticommons tragedy.
FIGURE 1. THE BOUNDARIES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
The interesting cases for modern property theory, private law
development, and constitutional inquiry bump up against these property
boundaries in Figure 1. In both a limited-access commons11 and a limited-
exclusion anticommons,12 discrete groups of owners can use or exclude
others from a valuable resource.13 The dynamics of rules bounding
fragmentation are a relatively little-analyzed, real-world problem,
particularly for what I call the “ property governance”  regimes emerging on
the commons and the anticommons ends of the property continuum. The
traditional image of private property as comprising sole ownership,14 a
11. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emissions Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 129-33 (1998) (identifying a range of
limited-access commons regimes).
12. Rose argues that the future of property theory appears in limited-access commons
regimes with complex internal governance rules. See id. at 132. I agree, but would add that
limited-exclusion anticommons regimes may pose even more vexing boundary opportunities and
problems for legislators, courts, and theorists. In conversation with colleagues, I have learned that
examples of limited-exclusion anticommons property are numerous: Sam Issacharoff notes
bottlenecks in microchip production; Howell Jackson suggests attention to demutualization in the
savings-and-loan and insurance industries; Jeff Lehman identifies examples in asset securitization,
real estate investment trusts, and the Superfund program.
13. Consider two people who are tenants in common of a farm—each cotenancy is itself
private property. To avoid overuse when owners’ preferences conflict, property law interposes a
nonwaivable “ right to partition.”  See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 114 (1989) (discussing partition). However, when too many co-owners
share a farm, physical “ partition in kind”  can lead to uneconomically small lots and underuse.
Judges prevent underuse by favoring “ partition by sale”  over “ partition in kind,”  by dividing
money rather than land among co-owners. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 914, 916
(1946) (“ [D]ivision of this quarter section of land . . . into four or more separate tracts would
materially depreciate its value, both as to its salability and as to its use for agricultural
purposes.” ).
14. As Michelman notes, the conventional definition of private property requires that the
rules “ must allow that at least some objects of utility or desire can be fully owned by just one
person. To be a ‘full owner’ of something is to have complete and exclusive rights . . . over it.”
Michelman, supra note 8, at 5.
  Open  Limited        Sole  Limited     Full
 Access   Access   Ownership        Exclusion        Exclusion
A  B   C etc. A  B  C etc.  A   B   C  etc. A B  C etc.  A   B   C  etc.
Commons     Private Property      Anticommons
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familiar type of ownership at the center of Figure 1, will hardly be relevant
in the discussion that follows.15
The main goals of this Article are to identify the boundary principle at
the core of private property and to show how this principle challenges
takings doctrine. Part II ranges across the Anglo-American law of property
to define the boundary principle. Boundary rules are not oppressive or
paternalistic constraints on private property, nor are they a disconnected
“ jumble of techniques aimed at making land more marketable.” 16 Rather,
they are intrinsic to and constitutive of well-functioning private property
regimes. Part III situates the boundary principle in a theoretical framework.
Property scholars have discussed aspects of the boundary principle at a
systemic and doctrine-specific level, but none have identified its central
role in preventing tragedies of the commons or anticommons.17 If the
possibility of sole ownership is a formal element of private property, then
the boundary principle is its real world corollary. Part IV shows how the
boundary principle can be used to examine constitutional decision-making
regarding property fragments. To the extent the Court shapes its takings
jurisprudence from an efficiency perspective, the Justices should consider
the boundary principle’s wealth-maximizing effects. By overprotecting
fragments, the Court ensures anticommons waste without articulating
countervailing values and confronting the tradeoffs these values demand.18
15. Sole ownership is an ideal type, never reached in practice. Wherever the term appears in
this Article, it always assumes a thicket of restrictions limiting absolute dominion. See generally
Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95,
95 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995) [hereinafter EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS]
(discussing the restrictions present in Blackstone’s time); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property
Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1998) (“ Blackstone himself was
thoroughly aware of [the] pervasive and serious qualifications on exclusive dominion.” ). Perhaps
sole ownership emerged as the private property paradigm because of land’s status as “ the central
metaphor for property itself.”  Rose, supra note 11, at 136. Water is equally a fundamental
resource, but it is usually embedded in a limited-access commons regime. See id. at 625; see also
Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996)
(comparing the effects of land and water metaphors on property law).
16. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, PROPERTY 605 (1985).
17. The economic aspect of the “ boundary principle”  may be most readily defined by
reference to Michelman’s description of “ constraints on decomposition”  in private property
regimes. See Michelman, supra note 8, at 15-20. As often happens, Michelman’s theoretical lead
is precise and indispensable, nevertheless, the idea of “ constraints on decomposition”  suggests
the mechanism but not the effect or real world extent of the boundary principle. See infra Section
III.C (discussing and distinguishing Michelman’s theory).
18. Competing goals could range from libertarian to redistributive. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359
(1982) (rejecting boundary rules because they impose a “ collective vision”  that limits owners’
ability to further values they prefer); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming Sept. 1999) (exploring distributive justice perspectives on takings law). I do
not mean to give short shrift in this Article to the many social values that may underlie
fragmentation rules. On the contrary, I hope that in pointing out the conflicting understandings of
efficiency embedded in the common law and the Court’s takings jurisprudence will encourage
judges and commentators to focus more precisely on what these social values are and on how
much they are worth to us. If I am right, then the economically-minded members of the Court
HELL02.DOC 04/02/99 8:53 PM
1999] Boundaries of Private Property 1169
Private property is a more subtle institution than scholars and judges
have often realized. Like Humpty Dumpty,19 resources prove easier to break
up than to put back together. Identifying the boundary principle threads
together disparate property doctrines, clarifies strange asymmetries in
property theory, and unknots some takings law puzzles.
II. THE BOUNDARY PRINCIPLE IN PROPERTY LAW
This Part canvasses Anglo-American property law to show that the
boundary principle is a pervasive component of well-functioning private
property regimes. While governments rarely enacted the doctrines that
follow with efficiency concerns as their primary (or even secondary)
motivations, the doctrines have often persisted, in part, because they have
proven conducive to productive uses of resources.20 Many of these
boundary rules accidentally and incompletely solved problems of
transaction costs, strategic bargaining, and cognitive biases that would
otherwise have led owners to waste resources.
Ownership can be analyzed in many dimensions. One useful framework
distinguishes among categories of ownership I call “ physical things,”
“ legal things,”  and “ legal relations.”  While distinctions among these three
types of fragmentation are primarily useful as organizational tools, the three
categories do correspond to historical shifts in property theory and to trends
in constitutional decision-making. Within each type of ownership, boundary
doctrines can operate directly, by preventing and abolishing fragments;
indirectly, by imposing costs on ownership that deter fragmentation; and
informally, through non-legal institutions and norms that replace formal
boundary rules.21
cannot simultaneously: (1) hold to a view celebrating the common law as a repository of efficient
solutions to complex problems; and (2) believe that private property is simply a bundle of
entitlements that owners should be able to chop up as they please.
19. Fairy tales are always a risky source for legal analogy. On the other hand, a recent Lexis
search revealed 199 legal articles relying on Humpty Dumpty. In this, his 200th appearance,
Humpty Dumpty can convey the fragility of private property and the difficulty of rebundling
fragments: It is easier to make an omelet out of an egg than an egg out of an omelet. Perhaps
Goldilocks (in her 42nd appearance) could also serve as an organizing fairy tale: To function well,
private property must be structured “ just right,”  without too many competing users or excluders.
As an aside, Lexis reveals that law professors venture scientific analogies rather less often. Only a
handful of articles, for example, explore the metaphoric possibilities of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. This Law could be read to suggest that fragmenting private property past an
equilibrium range may irreversibly dissipate its productive force.
20. See Michelman, supra note 8, at 15-16.
21. This Part streamlines the discussion by focusing on the anticommons side of the property
continuum. Boundary rules on the commons side are equally complex. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979) (discussing the “ reasonable use”  doctrine for riparian owners
of a watercourse); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 750-55 (A. James Casner ed., 1952)
[hereinafter ALP] (discussing “ unitization”  as one of several methods for correlating oil field
ownership interests). Moreover, to limit the need for background explanations, this Part illustrates
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A. Physical Boundaries: From Primogeniture to Gene Patents
1. Defining Physical Things
According to the lay intuition, private property is often thought of as a
physical thing that can be physically divided.22 Under this view, Blackacre
itself
 is the core of private property. Cut in half, it yields Blackacre and
Whiteacre, each equally private property. Cut in half again, the resulting
lots are still private property. At some point, however, the lots become so
checkerboarded23 that the land can no longer be used productively if each of
the fragments is still labeled as private property. No fragment owner can
overcome the bargaining hurdles necessary to gain sole ownership of the
underlying resource on a usable scale. Because too many people each may
have the right to use or to exclude, the resource may be wasted in a tragedy
of the commons or anticommons.
2. Early Mechanisms
Historically, there have been many reasons to prevent excessive
physical fragmentation. Prior to developing indirect taxation mechanisms,
undivided land provided the basis for public goods such as a military
force.24 Soon after the Norman Conquest, knight service required
landholdings large enough to support provisions for a certain number of
armed men on horses.25 Nevertheless, tenants had social and economic
incentives to fragment land by subinfeudation, particularly to avoid paying
how boundary rules operate by using familiar property doctrines rather than the more intricate
environmental or corporate law examples alluded to earlier.
22. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 98-100 (1977)
(discussing the layperson’s view of property as thing-ownership); Thomas C. Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69 (1980) (distinguishing thing-
ownership and bundle-of-rights metaphors). Even after Ackerman’s book, the “ thingness”  of
property plays an underappreciated role in property theory.
23. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1979) (discussing the use of
large-scale “ checkerboard”  land grants to spur railroad development). Self-interest is the most
powerful mechanism that prevents downward checkerboarding; no single legal rule does so. See
generally
 Heller, supra note 8, at 682-84 (discussing the Quaker Oats Big Inch Land Giveaway);
Michelman, supra note 8, at 9, 35 n.14 (noting that property law permits checkerboard ownership
even at the square centimeter level, though such ownership tends towards economic
inconvenience).
24. In the early common law, feudal ownership of real property consisted of personal as well
as economic relationships. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, LAND OWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 21, on file with author) (“ It was all very like Chicago in the
days of Al Capone, when Capone’s henchmen were installed in various profitable enterprises in
return for an obligation to rub out rivals whenever instructed to do so. In return, Al Capone
provided them with various forms of protection . . . .” ).
25. See id; see also A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 47-102 (2d ed. 1986)
(detailing the origins of the fee simple in England).
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feudal incidents.26 In response to increasing fragmentation by tenants, the
Statute Quia Emptores27
 prevented further fragmentation via subinfeudation
and, in exchange, gave tenants rights to market undivided holdings.28
Primogeniture, the passing of an estate to the first-born son, also
prevented physical fragmentation of land among aristocratic families in
early England.29 Though designed with dynastic goals foremost in mind,
primogeniture ensured that land would remain physically unfragmented
over generations and thereby be available to support the ambitions of
family patriarchs.30 These rules did not carry over to America,31 where land
was considered more plentiful and the common law developed other
mechanisms to prevent excessive fragmentation. Despite the demise of
primogeniture, modern American “ elective share”  statutes32along with
intestacy rules that limit fragmentation among heirs and escheat undivided
land to the state33can function as pale reflections of old-fashioned
physical boundary-enforcing mechanisms. What is striking in modern
property law is how much physical fragmentation is permitted, rather than
how little.
When societies lack effective rules to prevent spatial fragmentation,
landholdings may split as they pass down the generations,34 often inspiring
more radical measures to reaggregate land into viable parcels. In
26. See SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 21).
27. For a further discussion of the Statute Quia Emptores, see CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra
note 13, at 143-49.
28. See SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 22) (“ In so far as the early feudal world
resembled Al Capone’s Chicago, alienation, if it involved substituting one henchman for another,
would obviously require Capone’s consent. . . . But Quia Emptores Terrarum permitted and
indeed required such substitution, and deprived lords of any power to prevent it.” ).
29. See id.
30. See id. By mandating that the eldest son inherited all of his father’s land, primogeniture
kept an identifiable person available to carry the burden of feudal services and incidents. The
younger children received non-estate “ portions.”  Susan Staves, Resentment or Resignation?
Dividing the Spoils Among Daughters and Younger Sons, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS,
supra
 note 15, at 194, 194-99.
31. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 37-41 (1997).
32. In the many states with modern “ elective share”  statutes, a surviving spouse may elect to
take a statutory share, usually one-half or one-third, of all the decedent’s real and personal
property. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 526-34 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing conventional elective share law and the 1990 Uniform Probate Code’s redesigned
elective share); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 400-02 (3d ed. 1993); see
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 388-402 (4th ed.
1990). Rules governing dower and curtesy also can have similar consolidating effects. See id. at
375-77.
33. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 200-01.
34. In places such as 19th-century Ireland, families starved, each on their dispersed plots, in
part because land often became too fragmented to support sustainable agriculture. See Cynthia E.
Smith, Comment, The Land-Tenure System in Ireland: A Fatal Regime, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 469,
481-83 (1993). Working in rural Bangladesh during the late 1980s, I noticed the identical
problem, with people still living under feudal arrangements and starving because plots and rights
had become so intricately fragmented that many families could not assemble viable farms.
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Blackstone’s time, the main spatial consolidation mechanisms were the
hundreds of “ Local and Personal Acts of Parliament”  by which landowners
enclosed agricultural lands, entrepreneurs consolidated land for industrial
schemes, and local governments engaged in wide-scale public works.35
While the agricultural enclosure movement in England was complex, and
its history is contested,36 enclosure, at a minimum, defragmented farmland
by abolishing interests in physical strips and set the stage for farming on a
more economically viable scalethough terrible social costs were imposed
in the process.37
When public policy encourages the formation of lots that are too small
to use productively, owners may have a difficult time aggregating them to a
more viable scale.38 For example, in nineteenth-century frontier America,
homesteaders in parts of the country received plots too small to be
economically viable, given local climate conditions and existing
agricultural technology.39 Because homestead laws prevented sale prior to
acquiring full ownership, people either stayed and starved or abandoned the
land. A checkerboard of uneconomic and abandoned farms resulted, with
no legal mechanisms to consolidate ownership to a viable scale.40 With
homesteading, a tragedy of the anticommons emerged because the
government prohibited consolidationa legislative mistake unlike the
previous examples where owners, pursuing their own individual agendas,
excessively fragmented their own resources.
35. See SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 30-32). As Simpson notes, the widespread use
of these Acts “ reflect[s] the belief that rapid economic development is not compatible with too
strong respect for the individual autonomy of the landowner. . . . In a sense the legal system
enhanced the positive economic freedom of entrepreneurs at the cost of diminishing the negative
freedom of individual property owners.”  Id. at 32.
36. See Frank A. Sharman, An Introduction to the Enclosure Acts, 10 J. LEGAL HIST. 45, 47-
50 (1989).
37. See SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 18-19); see also id. at 303 n.24, 304 n.58
(collecting and evaluating the sources); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J.
1315, 1392 nn.386-90 (1993) (compiling and assessing sources); cf. J.M. NEESON, COMMONERS:
COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-1820 (1993) (arguing
that the inefficiency of the old system has been exaggerated).
38. According to Ellickson, “ the events of [the] enclosure movement illustrate how land
rights may become ‘excessively decomposed.’ When a group is stymied by large-number
coordination problems, it is possible that a state or other higher authority may usefully intervene
to facilitate modernization.”  Ellickson, supra note 37, at 1392 (citation omitted).
39. See Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family FarmsThe Way Ahead, 45 DRAKE L. REV.
311, 327 (1997) (“ Farms and ranches are now measured in thousand acre increments in eastern
Montana, unlike the old 320 acre measurement of a homestead. . . . As one passes the many
abandoned small homesteads and ghost towns, one cannot help but wonder what it would have
cost society to preserve these thousands of homesteads as viable economic units.” ). In Montana,
full ownership required working the land for a practically unattainable number of years. See An
Act To Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 161) (repealed 1976).
40. See Bahls, supra note 39, at 327.
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3. Modern Land Use Controls
In modern American law, the boundary principle limits spatial
fragmentation of real property through a variety of direct and indirect
mechanisms. For example, zoning and subdivision rules often have
minimum lot sizes, floor areas, and setbacks that prevent people from
spatially fragmenting resources too much.41 Absent regulation, owners may
fragment land without considering the externalities they impose on
neighbors, or the intergenerational costs of later bundling to achieve
economies of scale. Occasionally, developers subdivide land too far ahead
of development, go bankrupt, and leave behind fragmented ownership that
cannot be reassembled easily.42 From a welfare standpoint, the lot-sizing
problem can be cast as one of encouraging all cost-justified fragmentation
and no more.
While cities may abuse their zoning powers to keep out newcomers, the
poor, and racial minorities,43 the dynamics of the one-way ratchet of
fragmentation suggest another logic for minimum lot sizes: to counteract
market forces that might lead individuals to break up land too much.
Because it may be easier for zoning regulators to allow more fragmentation
later than for individuals to turn the ratchet back and reassemble land,44
regulators keep lots relatively large as a buffer against a costly tragedy of
the anticommons.
Property taxes and registration fees prove to be powerful, indirect
mechanisms that deter excessive fragmentation, even if bounding private
property is not their primary purpose.45 For example, the 1976 Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)46 provides that holders of
unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with annual filing
requirements forfeit their property.47 In upholding the constitutionality of
this private law approach to consolidating fragmented ownership, the Court
41. These regulations may be primarily revenue-driven efforts to ensure that newcomers are
overall contributors to, rather than net consumers of, local government services. See Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
49-50 (1990) (discussing local governments’ incentives to engage in fiscal zoning).
42. See, e.g., Rick v. West, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
43. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
44. For an account of the difficulties of land assembly in New York, see ANDREW ALPERN &
SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUTS! (1984).
45. See Heller, supra note 8, at 683 (“ [T]he requirements that owners incur the costs of
registering title and paying property taxes, and the subsequent escheat of the land for failure to do
so, function[ ] as powerful mechanisms to return the low-value [fragments] to a bundle of usable
private property.” ).
46. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
47. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (upholding the constitutionality of
FLPMA against a takings claim).
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described the results of bad mining law and Congress’s response to the
problem:
By the 1960s, it had become clear that this 19th-century laissez-
faire regime had created virtual chaos with respect to the public
lands. In 1975, it was estimated that more than 6 million unpatented
mining claims existed on public lands other than the national
forests; in addition, more than half the land in the National Forest
System was thought to be covered by such claims. . . . [N]o simple
way existed for determining which public lands were subject to
mining locations. . . . [In response,] the Act establishes a federal
recording system that is designed . . . to rid federal lands of stale
mining claims.48
By imposing an annual disclosure expense, Congress intended that
FLPMA would lead owners to abandon low-value fragments. More
generally, rules ensuring that owners bear a minimum cost for both creating
and maintaining fragments can deter at least some excessive fragmentation
and can encourage owners to abandon low-value lots to the state, which can
rebundle and recycle them.49
4. The Intellectual Property Analogy
Tangible property, both real and personal, still forms the core of the lay
conception of private property50 and the source of the most thickly
developed boundary rules. But the locus of economic value is shifting to
intellectual, ecological, corporate, and other intangible property.51 Because
people cannot physically hold intangible property, they may have relatively
unformed intuitions about viable boundaries.52 Like real property, there is a
viable spatial and temporal scale within which intangible property functions
efficiently as private property.
To give an intellectual property example, patent law only weakly
prevents excessive fragmentation in biomedical research.53 Old-fashioned
boundary doctrines, such as the “ utility”  requirement in patent law, have
not kept pace with technological change.54 Rebecca Eisenberg and I have
48. Id. at 86-87.
49. See Heller, supra note 8, at 682-84 (arguing that registration fees consolidated ownership
in the area of the Big Inch Land Giveaway).
50. See ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 97-100.
51. See generally id. at 166 (discussing intangible property as a locus of economic value).
52. See id.
53. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 700 (discussing the possibility of increasing the
threshold of the utility requirement as a way to prevent the anticommons problem resulting from
the patenting of anonymous gene fragments).
54. See id. at 699-700.
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argued that creating property rights in isolated gene fragments seems
unlikely to track socially useful bundles of property rights—a form of
excessive “ physical”  fragmentation.55 Granting overlapping patents on
individual gene fragments may deter innovation or require firms to
overcome strategic behaviors, cognitive biases, and costly bundling
transactions before developing commercial products.56 Thus, the
proliferation of intellectual property rights in upstream research may be
stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research
and product development.57
Although patent law has few formal mechanisms to deter excessive
fragmentation, informal institutions may be able to re-scale fragmented
resources to put them into productive use. Communities of intellectual
property owners who interact on a recurring basis sometimes develop
institutions to reduce transaction costs for bundling multiple licenses.58 For
example, in the music industry, copyright collectives have evolved so
broadcasters and other producers can readily obtain rights to use numerous
works copyrighted by different owners.59 In the automobile, aircraft, and
synthetic rubber industries, patent pools have emerged, sometimes with the
help of government, when licenses under multiple patent rights were
thought necessary to develop important new products.60 Such informal and
semi-formal institutions may expand the range over which private property
functions effectively and reduce the precision necessary in the formal law.61
Intellectual property law in biomedical research is at the fragmentation
frontier where formal boundary rules and informal institutions have yet to
coalesce. People may break up and claim property, while legislators and
judges play catch up and try to reassemble the pieces. As the importance of
intellectual property grows, it will become apparent that overly fragmented
intellectual property can prove just as costly as the more familiar real
property examples.
55. Future commercial products will more likely require the use of larger pieces of DNA,
such as those that encode full-length genes. See id. at 699.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 701.
58. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); cf. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note
5, at 700 (questioning the conditions under which such institutions may emerge in the biomedical
research area).
59. See Merges, supra note 58, at 1328-40.
60. See id. at 1340-47.
61. Compared with patent law, copyright law’s tragedy of the anticommons is less costly.
The “ fair use”  doctrine means that copyright holders do not have the right to exclude nonowners
from low-intensity uses of protected works. For more intensive uses, the gains from use provide
economic rents that support the transaction costs of acquiring licenses. Though fair use reduces
underuse, some underuse remains because of transaction costs and because copyright holders,
who are not perfectly discriminating monopolists, charge a positive price for a zero marginal cost
use.
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B. Legal Boundaries: From Numerus Clausus to Reverter Acts
1. Defining Legal Things
Many current fragmentation problems arise from subdividing what may
be called legal things. With legal things, it is the fee simple in Blackacre,
not Blackacre itself, that is the core of private property. Halved, the legal
thing may yield a present and a future interest, or a freehold and a non-
freehold estate. Divided still further, legal things may be broken down into
fee tails, easements, and the other allowable forms of the numerus
clausus—a useful term in continental civil-law systems that describes the
basic forms of ownership that a given legal system allows.62 As with
physical fragmentation, at some point, preserving fragments of legal things
as private property diminishes the productivity of resources even though
each fragment may still have some positive economic value.
2. Estates
The boundary principle limits fragmentation of legal things.63 At a basic
level, property law sharply restricts the allowable forms of property
ownershipincluding, for example, the fee simple, fee tail, and servitude.64
One can break a fee simple into smaller fee simples, even into defeasible
fee simples, but not into a fee complicated. Why not? Bernard Rudden
notes: “ The current literature offers no economic explanation of the
numerus clausus, but seems largely to ignore its existence.”65 One could
argue that there is no reason for the limits of the numerus clausus. If an
owner creates a nonstandard legal thing and others reject it, then the owner
bears the cost through a lower property value, while bundling entrepreneurs
gain an opportunity to profit. After considering a range of arguments to
62. Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in
OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 239, 242 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 3d ed. 1987). In
Blackstone’s time, the numerus clausus was much more numerous, populated with incorporeal
hereditaments such as corodies and advowdsons that no longer exist. See SIMPSON, supra note 25,
at 106-07, 121-22 (discussing these and other ancient forms of property). Over time, these forms
were pared down to the streamlined list that exists today. Now, the list may be growing again with
innovations such as condominiums and time shares.
63. See Michelman, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that private property “ abounds in restrictions
on decomposition of titles . . . : restrictive doctrines regarding easements in gross, perpetuities,
covenants running with the land, restraints on alienation, duration of cotenancies, ‘novel’
easements and estates, to name just some of the pertinent technicalities of the land law”  (footnotes
omitted)).
64. Rudden notes: “ In all ‘non-feudal’ systems with which I am familiar (whether earlier, as
at Rome, or later), the pattern is (in very general terms) similar: there are less than a dozen sorts of
property entitlements.”  Rudden, supra note 62, at 241. Through contracts, an entrepreneur can
combine the basic forms of the numerus clausus into more complex legal objects such as modern
financial derivatives or real estate investment trusts.
65. Id. at 261.
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explain the existence of the numerus clausus,66 Rudden’s most persuasive
argument foreshadows my anticommons analysis:
If, as in a development area, the property entitlement and
correlative burdens are widely dispersed, there will be holdout and
free-rider difficulties. Perhaps, then, there is sense in limiting the
occasions for any of these expensive situations by restricting, ere
their birth, the class of [legal things]. If this be a good reason, it is
strange that so little of the standard doctrine and case law spells it
out.67
Even within the narrow confines of the numerus clausus, the centuries-
long struggle between landowners and the state over particular estates, such
as the fee tail and life estate, further limited the temporal fragmentation of
legal things.68 By putting property in tail, owners attempted to control
resources beyond their lifetimes, thereby placing the costs of the resulting
decrease in productivity on future generations and on society.69 In a
complex story, judges minimized the social costs of this intertemporal
fragmentation by limiting the tail (though they may have increased spatial
fragmentation).70 The evisceration of the fee tail and life estate represents
an example of the social benefits from consistent application of the
boundary principle prevailing (to an extent) over owners’ desires for
unrestricted temporal fragmentation.71
66. See id. at 245-60. For example, each new estate with its attendant incidents and duties
imposes social costs for those who are trying to figure out what they own. Standardized estates
give land more value because they reduce the costs of transacting over land. See id. at 253-54.
67. Id. at 259.
68. See SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36) (“ The ideal function of the entail was to
preserve a family landowning territory as a single block, and pass it down the male line of a
family ad infinitum.” ); SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 81-102 (detailing the technicalities). The
Statute de Donis Conditionabilis
 of 1285 permitted what became known as the fee tail. 13 Edw.,
ch. 1 (Eng.). Within 200 years, common-law courts created mechanisms to defeat the entail. See
CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 49 (discussing techniques for defeating the entail).
69. Tenants holding in tail could block the execution of long leases, mortgages, and other
productivity-enhancing uses of land. In the early 19th-century American context, James Kent
acknowledged that “ the desire to preserve and perpetuate family influence and property is very
prevalent in mankind, and is deeply seated in the human affections,”  but then proceeded to
criticize the fee tail’s unintended consequences for productivity. 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 19, cited in ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 146.
70. See SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36). The common law developed mechanisms
such as the fictitious lawsuit of the common recovery to bar the entail and, finally, in the 19th
century, gave the tenant in tail the power to convey a fee simple to another by deed. See id. Today
the fee tail has been, for the most part, abolished or severely limited in its effect. The few U.S.
states that still recognize the fee tail construe it to limit the period during which the estate is
fragmented. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 213-14.
71. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON
LAW 144-62 (1987) (contrasting the English and Scottish entails).
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While new estates are rarely admitted to the numerus clausus,72 the
emergence of the common-law trust shows that new forms can be created.73
The law of trust embodies a complex solution to the familiar problem of
inter-temporal fragmentation or “ dead hand control.” 74 It controls excessive
fragmentation by channeling individual freedom to dispose of assets. In
Gregory Alexander’s terms, the debate on trust law has obscured the
conflict between the donor’s “ freedom of disposition”  and the law’s
tendency to keep resources in “ consolidated form.” 75
The trust can help wealthy owners keep resources intact across
generations without the productivity-destroying effects of fee tails or life
estates.76 More importantly, the trust offers an increasingly useful
alternative to the corporate form, particularly for pensions, mutual funds,
and asset securitization.77 Using equitable ownership and trust control keeps
the underlying corpus unfragmented and well-scaled for productive use. At
the same time, the income stream generated by the trust can be finely
fragmented among generations and individuals. Rather than requiring
complex negotiations among owners of real property, the trust form offers a
standard governance structure with a trustee as the sole decisionmaker.
72. New forms of negative easements, such as conservation easements, may qualify as a
recent American addition to the numerus clausus. See Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey,
Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1989). When such
servitudes are cast in covenant form, under the common law the burden will not run if the benefit
is in gross, which is the usual case. In response, states have authorized conservation easements by
statute. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 901-02.
73. A recent continuation of an old debate considers the extent to which the trust is properly
part of contract or property law. Compare Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of
Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 469-72 (1998)
(arguing that the trust is a distinct property institution because of its effects on third-party
creditors), with John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 646-47 (1995) (arguing that the trust is functionally indistinguishable from modern third-
party beneficiary contracts).
74. While the common law has accepted the trust form, civil-law regimes still find the trust
controversial and have yet to admit it to the numerus clausus. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note
73, at 442.
75. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth
Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1189 n.1 (1985) (identifying the “ consolidation form”  shaping
trust law).
76. In 1925, England abolished legal future interests in favor of the trust. See C. Dent
Bostick, Loosening the Grip of the Dead Hand: Shall We Abolish Legal Future Interests in
Land?, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1090-97 (1979). While the continued existence of legal future
interests in the United States poses knotty problems for law students, such interests no longer
impose significant costs upon lawyers because of flexible alternatives in modern trust law.
77. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 73, at 466-69.
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3. Future Interests
Early property law developed boundary rules to limit inter-temporal
fragmentation78 that have been mostly subsumed into the tortuous Rule
Against Perpetuities (RAP).79 Scholars use several familiar vocabularies to
discuss how the RAP addresses excessive fragmentation. Some scholars
refer to conflicts over alienability between current and future generations;80
others argue that the RAP does not increase alienability in general, but only
makes one particular estate, the fee simple, more alienable.81 Following this
approach, some scholars frame the debate as one between an individual’s
freedom to alienate and society’s interest in preserving the marketability of
the underlying resource.82 Recognizing that purely private decisions about
78. Three archaic rules—the Rule in Shelley’s Case, the Doctrine of Worthier Title, and the
Destructibility of Contingent Remainders—prevented an owner from adopting certain feudal tax-
avoiding techniques of fragmenting land between a current user and an unascertained future
owner. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 242-47.
79. This rule limits the period of time during which an owner can fragment property and
limits the grantor’s ability to impede future productive use. See 6 ALP, supra note 21, § 26.2. The
period is generally defined as lives in being at the time of the creation of the interest plus 21 years.
See
 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
80. For example, in this vein, Lewis Simes, in his Thomas Cooley lectures at the University
of Michigan, noted that the Rule “ strikes a fair balance between the desires of members of the
present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations, to do what they wish with the
property which they enjoy.”  LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58 (1955).
Simpson is critical of these types of justifications:
Modern textbooks as well as historical works tend to portray the law of real property as
a body of law which has zealously protected the power of free alienation of land, and
the Rule Against Perpetuities (and associated doctrines) as an effective curb against
attempts to destroy this power in landowners.
SIMPSON, supra note 25, at 241; see also SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 159-60. In contrast to Simes,
Simpson argues that
the function of the rule was to regulate a system of gift giving whose primary function
was ensuring that a family retained a permanent endowment. . . . The intermittent
freedom to dispose of the fee simple which the system conferred was indeed not
usually employed to place family lands on the market, but merely to resettle them as
seemed appropriate and tie them up for another generation.
SIMPSON, supra note 24 (manuscript at 37).
81. As Sterk notes, “ individual present and future estates in land could be made freely
alienable. In fact, the rule itself restricts alienability only by prohibiting certain methods of
alienation.”  Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 639 (1985).
82. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 474. Jeffery Stake agrees and elaborates:
[T]he Rule’s tendency to aggregate rights should lead to improved allocation of assets
for two reasons. First, the costs of disaggregation and aggregation are asymmetrical. It
is comparatively easy to divide the bundle of rights if divided rights would generate
more wealth than would a single fee simple. Conversely, due to the problems of
locating multiple holders and the possibilities of strategic bargaining such as holding
out, it is much more costly to reaggregate rights if a fee simple would generate more
wealth. Since private transactions are thus more difficult in one direction than private
transactions going the other way, the Rule can be expected to reduce transaction costs
by leaving the parties in the position that is more easily changed. . . . 
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the use of property can impose long-term social costs,83 the RAP
conclusively presumes a point after which the social cost of fragmentation
exceeds private gains.
The RAP is an example of the “ strong-form path dependence” 84 of
particular boundary rules. Its contours result from long-lost political
battles;85 and its present form baffles and confuses. Yet the Rule, in some
form or another, proves resilient because all versions retain its most useful
incidental feature, which is to limit inter-temporal fragmentation.86 Whether
measured by lives in being at the time of the creation of the interest, by the
“ two lives rule,” 87 or by a fixed term such as ninety years,88 almost every
state retains some version of the RAP.89 If the Rule were abolished, states
would have to address in some other way the likelihood that testators
planning for death would make choices that diverge too far from the social-
welfare maximizing use of a resource, sometimes resulting in the
destruction of resource productivity.90
Second, there is empirical evidence that the packages of rights resulting from the
operation of the Rule are more desirable to the market than the packages intended by
the transferor.
Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL. L. REV.
705, 723 (1990).
83. See 6 ALP, supra note 21, § 26.2 (noting the “ balancing of social interests”  involved in
the RAP).
84. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 651-
52 (1996).
85. Lost perhaps to most readers, but not to Brian Simpson or to George Haskins. See
SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 159; George Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand:
Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977)
(arguing that the Rule emerged as a compromise that allowed old dynasties to keep land tied up
for long periods of time while responding to the desires of the new rich to have land released from
old family settlements).
86. Modern RAPs translate the common law limits into various forms (wait-and-see or 90
years) but keep intact the basic point that an owner cannot fragment rights too much for too long.
See
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983).
87. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 118-21.
88. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988).
89. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32 at 316 (noting the four states that have
abolished the Rule, though these states nevertheless require that the property be held in trust and
that trustees have the power to sell the trust assets); WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 32, at 1162.
90. Abolishing the RAP can have unexpected consequences. For example, the federal
generation-skipping tax (GST) contains a $1 million exemption ($2 million per couple) that relies
solely on state RAPs to police temporal fragmentation. In states that have abolished the RAP,
people can now create true dynasty trusts—trusts that can, in principle, last forever—with ever-
increasing numbers of potential beneficiaries. States are beginning to compete to attract the
dynasty trust business. “ This fledgling movement poses a disturbing threat to controlling the dead
hand. Until Congress or the Treasury Department closes this loophole in the GST tax, the wealthy
will continue to have an unbridled option of creating dynasty trusts.”  WAGGONER ET AL., supra
note 32 , at 1162.
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As a boundary rule, all forms of the RAP prove quite deficient. Not
only does the RAP allow people to fragment property for a very long time,91
but more crucially, it exempts coverage of future interests created in the
grantor, such as “ possibilities of reverter”  and “ rights of entry.”92 These
exempted interests can destroy resource productivity, not because owners
are inchoate, but because identifying reversioners poses high practical
costs. To the extent future interests created in grantors are alienable, as they
often are,93 the RAP becomes a purely formal constraint that can be evaded
by competent drafting.94
Some of the most startling boundary rules to emerge recently are those
that prevent a tragedy of the anticommons by filling gaps that the RAP’s
odd limits create. For example, “ reverter acts”  abolish vested, valuable
legal things including possibilities of reverter and rights of entry.95 Some
states limit these venerable interests to a certain number of years, beyond
which the possessory fee becomes absolute and the vested future interest
becomes invalid,96 while other states even eliminate these property interests
retroactively.97 Courts have generally upheld reverter acts against takings
challenges on the grounds that excessive fragmentation clogs title and
reduces marketability of property.98 Similarly, “ marketable title acts”
eliminate certain property interests that are not re-recorded after a statutory
period.99 There is a stark contrast between reverter acts and marketable title
acts that destroy existing ownership fragments to avoid a tragedy of the
anticommons, and recent Court decisions discussed in Part IV that preserve
fragments and ensure tragedy.
91. See SIMPSON, supra note 71, at 159 (noting that “ the contemporary oddity of the rule lies
not in what it prevents, but in how much it allows” ).
92. Alternatively, as Sterk notes, possibilities of reverter and rights of entry could be
characterized as interests that satisfy the RAP because they are vested at the time of creation. See
Sterk, supra note 81, at 642. In either case, the RAP does not sweep away these interests, which
could potentially remain viable for centuries as inchoate ownership fragments. By contrast,
English statutory law makes these interests subject to the RAP. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 32, at 299.
93. See id. at 238 (discussing the modern trend).
94. Alternatively, RAP violations can be avoided through the use of perpetuities-savings
clauses. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 32, at 1128-34. Perpetuities-savings clauses do not,
however, avoid the RAP’s limits on temporal fragmentation.
95. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
96. See LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1994, at
273-74 (2d ed. 1956); see also Sterk, supra note 81, at 642-43 nn.112-14 (collecting state
statutes).
97. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 96, § 1994, at 275.
98. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 299 (citing cases).
99. See, e.g., UNIF. MARKETABLE TITLE ACT, 13 U.L.A. 112 (1990 & Supp. 1995)
(establishing a statutory period of 30 years). See generally Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title
Acts—Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 47, 52-60 (1967) (discussing these
acts). In Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), the Supreme Court upheld a retroactive Indiana
marketable title act that abolished unused mineral claims not re-recorded every 20 years. See id at.
518.
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When formal boundary mechanisms fail to ensure a viable scale of
resource use, then private and informal institutions may emerge to manage
fragmented legal things more efficiently.100 For example, one might expect
that property law would require recording of easements, covenants, liens,
and other potentially hidden ownership fragments that threaten to decrease
productivity.101 Instead, the private, contract-based institution of title
insurance emerged, ensuring that a buyer can acquire at least the money
equivalent of an unfragmented parcel even if undisclosed ownership
interests exist.102 Title insurance represents the price society pays for
allowing undiscoverable private fragmentation.103
C. Relational Boundaries: From Condos to the California Coast
1. Defining Legal Relations
Finally, the core of private property can also be conceived as a bundle
of legal relations in Blackacre. Dividing this bundle in half may break up
the “ right to lease”  from the “ right to sell,”  but each smaller subset of
legal relations still may be recognizable as private property.104 Unmoored
from the reference to a crystallized physical or legal thing, a bundle of legal
100. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 15-103 (1991) (discussing several informal means employed by California ranchers to
resolve disputes arising from wayward cattle); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 182-85 (1990) (discussing
sustainable informal management of commons resources); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739-49
(1986); Gary D. Libecap, Government Policies on Property Rights to Land: U.S. Implications for
Agricultural Development in Mexico, 60 AGRIC. HIST., Winter 1986, at 32, 41-45 (describing
efforts by the Navajo to prevent overgrazing on open ranges).
101. See Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression,
48 YALE L.J. 1125, 1126-29 (1939) (describing the “ wild disorder”  of the system of land title
transfer as it existed in 1939 and quoting Professor John R. Rood’s observation that “ [t]he fact is
that the path of the searcher for a safe title to land . . . is beset by more traps, sirens, harpies, and
temptations, than ever plagued the wandering Ulysses, the faithful Pilgrim, or the investor in gilt-
edged securities” ). McDougal and Brabner-Smith fulminate:
As he ploughs through the Joneses, Smiths, and Johnsons and through the deeds,
mortgages, judgments, taxes, and mechanics’ liens he can never be sure that he isn’t
missing something fatal to his title. Worse yet, all this laborious retracing of the
tortuous path of title is perpetual motion. Every time the land is sold or mortgaged or
subdivided—no matter into how small parts—it all has to be done over again . . . .
Id.
 at 1127.
102. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 722-23.
103. The underlying fragmentation may be efficient if the holder of the interests values them
more than the burdened party is harmed by the costs of discovery and compliance. Title
registration systems provide an alternative approach to handling fragmented ownership. The so-
called Torrens system that originated in Australia and is used in small parts of the United States
prevents hidden ownership interests. See John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title
Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 70-73, 80-115 (1992) (describing
and evaluating the Torrens system).
104. See Heller, supra note 8, at 663-64 n.192.
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relations poses the greatest difficulties for determining the boundaries of
private property. If property is a bundle of rights, then a bare legal relation
is something less. But what is it?
Legal relations, as this Article defines them, are distinct from legal
things. A legal thing, such as a fee simple, is a highly particularized
complex of legal relations that may include the discrete “ right to sell,”  “ the
right to devise,”  and similar rights. Along these same lines, an easement is
a complex legal thing that contains many more legal relations than simply
the stand-alone “ right to use.”  Each of the three metaphoric conceptions of
property overlap, certainly, but they reflect distinct traditions in property
theory, and are associated with distinct boundary rules and Court doctrine.
The legal relation conception is useful because society is generating
more forms of property than the simple thing-ownership metaphor captures.
In the context of a limited-access commons or a limited-exclusion
anticommons, people often create complex “ property governance”
structures to coordinate their legal relations with respect to each other and
to the external world. These intermediate forms of ownership vary widely,
with condominium associations and residential subdivisions closer to the
limited-exclusion end of the property continuum and certain public
regulatory regimes closer to the full-exclusion end of the continuum. In
both cases, internal governance mechanisms may not be developed enough
to overcome strategic bargaining problems and avoid a tragedy of the
anticommons.
2. Common-Interest Communities
Common-interest communities (CICs), including residential
subdivisions, condominiums, and cooperatives are perhaps the most
significant form of social reorganization of late twentieth-century
America.105 CICs allow developers to unlock social value by dividing land
horizontally and vertically and by fragmenting governance among a group
of owners.106 More recently, by breaking up ownership of each unit week-
105. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994) (projecting that 25% to 30% of Americans will live
in homeowner associations by the year 2000). By allowing a new type of affordable home
ownership, the popularization of common-interest community forms are among the great
innovations in modern property law. Developers choose these forms in part because their internal
governance structures solve coordination problems that were not solvable under the prior law of
servitudes and in part because the rules circumvent constraints in the public regulatory regime.
See generally
 Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional
Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (1991) (discussing tax
subsidies and organizational innovation as causes for the rise of condominium ownership).
106. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments,
77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 285-86 & n.44 (1997). For example, owners may decide to prevent each
other from leasing units at all. A single owner may be able to benefit by dividing ownership
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by-week, time-share condominiums have taken fragmentation to a new
extreme that increases property values, even while compounding the
potential anticommons tragedy.107 Limited equity cooperatives, in which
equity ownership of a unit is shared between a private owner and a local
government, are another new form that could both improve social value and
lead to a potential anticommons tragedy.108
CICs illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing good from bad
fragmentation.109 Developers began using the CIC form before fully
effective boundary rules on the anticommons side were devised.110 Default
boundary rules, imported from the law of servitudes, include judicial
resistance to the enforcement of affirmative covenants, the touch-and-
concern doctrine, restrictions on benefits held in gross, the change-of-
circumstances doctrine, and durational limits contained in marketable title
acts.111 Like the trust form discussed above, CICs now represent elaborate
systems to promote good fragmentation while limiting its social costs. But,
like the medieval fee tail, the modern CIC forms may give people too much
power to lock resources into low-value uses. The old-fashioned change-of-
circumstances doctrine, which removes covenants that have outlived their
usefulness, may be too weak to police governance failures in a modern
among short-term renters, but will externalize costs on the community in the form of a decreased
commitment to self-governance and increased costs of policing transience. As Sterk notes: “ The
two most common objections to transient occupants are: (1) financing for individual units is often
difficult to obtain unless the development is substantially owner-occupied; and (2) renters,
compared with owner-occupants, may have less incentive to observe association rules and to
maintain the premises.”  Id. at 285 n.44. The minimal efficient scale of ownership in a
condominium may require owner-occupiers rather than renters, given prevailing norms and
governance structures.
107. See generally Ellen R. Peirce & Richard A. Mann, Time-Share Interests in Real Estate:
A Critical Evaluation of the Regulatory Environment, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 9, 11-28 (1983)
(outlining various forms of time-share interests). In a typical example, a family might buy the
right to use a particular unit for a particular week each year. Creating the time-share form
involved disabling certain familiar boundary mechanisms, such as the unwaivable right to
partition cotenancies. To mitigate the potential for a tragedy of the anticommons, time-shares
typically contain a sunset clause that cashes out the interests after a fixed period—enforcing a
global partition by sale—and recreates the underlying resource as a single object of private
property. See id. at 17-20.
108. See Duncan Kennedy & Leopold Specht, Limited Equity Housing Cooperatives as a
Mode of Privatization, in A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE
OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 267, 268 (Gregory S. Alexander & Grayna Skpska eds., 1994);
see also
 Heller, supra note 8, at 649-50 (discussing limited equity cooperatives).
109. “ Good”  and “ bad”  law are technical terms that appear from time to time in modern
property theory. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION
IN THE THIRD WORLD 132 (1989) (defining good and bad law in economic terms).
110. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1527 (1982) (explaining the current status of governing documents and judicial interpretation of
those documents). See generally Sterk, supra note 81 (discussing how governing documents can
implicitly and explicitly create and limit association power).
111. See Sterk, supra note 81, at 644-56.
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homeowners’ association or condominium.112 Each owner may have an
effective veto over certain socially valuable changes, particularly those that
require amending the initial declaration.113
Even if the default boundary rules were inadequate, rational developers
should prefer to offer value-maximizing governance rules that prevent
people from blocking valuable adjustments.114 But anecdotal experience of
CIC regimes suggests otherwise.115 Because owners underestimate the
likelihood of change and overestimate the ease of future negotiations,116
they do not demand, and developers therefore have little incentive to offer,
change-supporting governance rules. Indeed, developers who offer more
flexible governance mechanisms may scare off those potential buyers who
predictably, but inaccurately, appraise their future needs. Instead, voting
rules in condominium or homeowners’ associations continue to give
excessive veto power to minorities of unit owners. Because of holdouts and
bargaining difficulties, CICs may find themselves locked into low-value
uses resulting in a tragedy of the anticommons.117
Current CIC laws represent an example of the one-way ratchet of
fragmentation within a limited-exclusion anticommons. As costs rise from
excessive veto rights, unit owners may develop informal institutions and
norms that help to consolidate these rights of exclusion. More formally,
legislatures may impose statutory solutions to abolish certain veto rights or
courts may fashion judicial supervision rules to the same effect. But, if
boundary mechanisms fail to emerge, CICs may fall further and further
behind their productivity frontier.
112. See UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT § 52-118, 74 U.L.A. § 2-118 (Supp. 1981)
(providing a statutory authorization for the modification of covenants by less than unanimous
consent); cf. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1317 (1982) (recommending that the change-of-circumstances
doctrine apply to requests for modification of covenants).
113. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 390 (“ If all parties agree, they of course can
modify covenants to accommodate new conditions. But this may be difficult to accomplish when
there are many parties, as there are in the large subdivision or condominium. One dissenter can
block change.” ).
114. See generally Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government
Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (1992) (exploring legal dilemmas
raised by CICs).
115. Rick Hills and I are working on an article in which we will explore whether a hidden
cost of condominium regulations may be that people now block each other too much and waste
some of the potential of resources held in condominium form.
116. See Lee Ross & C.A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessment, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 129 (D. Kahneman et al., eds., 1982).
117. There may be countervailing community-reinforcing benefits from locking people
together and forcing them to learn to deal with each other. Indeed, legal intervention may
paradoxically be counterproductive by undermining the social capital that the community has
created. See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2055, 2067 (1996).
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3. Overlapping Jurisdictions
Just as CIC owners and developers underestimate evolution in their
communities,118 master planners and zoners similarly fail to anticipate
change.119 But public systems of local zoning have had many decades to
build in flexibility mechanisms that can prevent individuals from exercising
excessive veto power. For example, if home offices or satellite dishes were
to become necessary accoutrements of the good life, then a majority vote or
administrative decision would be able to amend zoning rules or grant
variances in response.120 While the process of adjusting old public plans to
new social realities varies from community to community, an overarching
theme links the public decisionmaking mechanisms: No individual can
successfully hold out to block change.
Nevertheless, zoned communities can create a tragedy of the
anticommons by giving too many neighbors veto rights over reasonable
uses of land or by empowering too many overlapping jurisdictional bodies.
William Fischel has documented how the California Supreme Court
paralyzed land use development and excluded affordable housing by
creating a full-exclusion anticommons that gave unlimited numbers of
individuals the right to stop any particular development without bearing the
costs:
Had the court redistributed ownership from A to B, the Coase
theorem holds that the efficiency effects should be nil. . . . But in
depriving private owners of the right to develop their property, the
court did not choose any particular party to receive those rights. It
redistributed development rights from A to B, C, D, and the rest of
an indefinitely long alphabet.
The California court changed the legal rules so that any number
of parties could stop a given development up to the moment at
which it was physically improved. . . . California developers, who
had once been able to bargain with a local government and a finite
118. As John Cribbet and Corwin Johnson note:
Drafters of real covenants and equitable servitudes, as well as other documents, often
fail to address expressly events and circumstances that later occur. . . . One obvious
approach is to allow modification upon approval by fewer than all of the parties. But
even having to obtain approval by a simple majority of owners of lots might be unduly
burdensome.
CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 389-90.
119. See, e.g., Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719, 719 (1980)
(arguing that effective advance planning and zoning of communities is impossible).
120. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 839, 892-93 (1983) (applauding the tendency of local variance
boards to mediate disputes informally).
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set of state agencies, found that they had to bargain with parties
whose existence they were previously unaware of.121
Even projects that are fully cost-justified and desirable from
environmental, neighborhood, and regulatory perspectives may not go
forward because of the bargaining challenge that is endemic to full-
exclusion anticommons property.122 The tragedy of the anticommons that
has emerged imposes costs on individuals far beyond those seeking
affordable housing in California. As Fischel notes, “ the higher statewide
housing prices that resulted have adversely affected the national economy
by distorting the location decisions of firms and households.” 123
III. THE BOUNDARY PRINCIPLE IN PROPERTY THEORY
Across a range of disparate doctrines, the common law of property has
long been concerned with fixing the boundaries between private property
on the one hand and commons and anticommons property on the other.
Why has property theory focused so little on these private-law mechanisms
that prevent tragedies of the commons and anticommons? This Part
develops two closely intertwined answers. First, the metaphors that
theorists use to understand property have blinded them to the existence of
boundary principles in general, and second, the categories that theorists use
have led them to overlook anticommons property boundaries in
particular.124
121. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 251
(1995). This discussion raises the difficult problem of scale. In a residential subdivision, each plot
is ordinary private property, but collectively the community may be an anticommons if bargaining
problems prevent agreement, say to convert the land to its most valuable use as a car factory. How
practically should we distinguish anticommons fragments from ordinary private property? See
infra
 Subsection IV.D.3 (discussing the problem of scale).
122. As few as two regulatory bodies may create this type of problem when they resist
coordination. For example, after a lengthy process, Los Angeles gave a developer final approval
to build. Then, the California Coastal Commission asserted jurisdiction over the same subject
matter and stopped the development for two more years. The California Supreme Court recently
denied the landowner’s taking claim. See Landgate v. California Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188
(Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 179 (1998). According to one account:
The takings case began in 1990, when Landgate Inc. purchased what it believed to be a
buildable lot in the hills of Malibu.
. . . But when Landgate applied for a permit to build, the California Coastal
Commission balked. The lot lines of Landgate’s property, the commission noted, had
never been approved by the commission and were thus illegal. As it happened, Los
Angeles County . . . had signed off on a reconfiguration of the lot lines. . . .
. . . Landgate appealed, and [the court concluded that the CCC] was motivated by an
“ ongoing jurisdictional spat”  between itself and the county.
Greg Mitchell, Supreme Court Airs Takings, DNA Admissibility, THE RECORDER, Feb. 11, 1998,
at 1.
123. FISCHEL, supra note 121, at 252.
124. As Joseph Vining notes:
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The first Section focuses on the costly effects of inadequate metaphors,
particularly the switch from the thing-ownership to the bundle-of-rights
image of property. The second Section identifies an asymmetry in property
theory that has carried over into the Court’s jurisprudence. While property
law routinely bounds fragmentation on both sides of the property
continuum, property theory has missed the anticommons/private property
boundary.125 The final Section explains why prior attempts to define the
boundary principle have been limited and proposes an approach that may be
more useful for courts and legislators.
A. Property Metaphors and Property Boundaries
Justice Cardozo once warned, “ Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.” 126 According to the stylized history, people viewed property
as a physical thing or a legal thing until this century, when lawyers recast it
as an abstract bundle of legal relations.127 Though this standard story has
been taught to generations of law students128 and is applied daily by judges,
it is a thin account.129 Neither metaphor adequately conveys the nuanced
way law enforces property boundaries. In particular, the idea of property as
things misses the complex internal relations among owners of a thing, while
Unsympathetic smiles may be evoked by talk today of a concept of property or indeed a
concept of anything. So accustomed are we to concentrating on reasons of policy and
on the conclusory nature of legal categories that we tend to forget how channeled we
are by nothing more than a conceptual structure. . . . Time and the complexity of things
make it impossible to do otherwise. There are limits to the movement of our minds,
shared boundaries for which there is no better name in legal analysis than
“ concepts” —conclusions that we could question but choose not to, premises for
ordered thought and communication. Certainly analysis of property interests has had
limits beyond which we have chosen not to stray.
JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 24 (1978).
125. Property boundaries could be defined along many dimensions. As used in this Article,
boundaries differentiate commons and anticommons categories and leave aside other
theoretically-fraught oppositions such as property versus contract, in rem versus in personam
rights, traditional versus new property, private versus state property, and private versus socialist
property.
126. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
127. See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 311-13. Alexander traces the evolution of these
metaphors:
After the beginning of the twentieth century, American legal intellectuals increasingly
criticized the classical Blackstonian conception of property. . . . That conception . . .
they thought [was] both inaccurate and disingenuous—inaccurate because it wrongly
suggested it was possible for one person to have absolute freedom in the use and
control of his things; disingenuous because it hid from view the political function of
property.
Id. at 311.
128. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 86 (discussing the bundle of rights).
129. See Grey, supra note 22, at 69.
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the modern bundle metaphor suggests more fluidity than appears in existing
property relations.
1. Of Things, Physical and Legal
Under the old metaphor, property involves the physical ownership of
discrete, individually owned things,130 an image symbolized by the
medieval ceremony of “ livery of seisin”  which gathered the buyer and the
seller of a land parcel in a field to exchange ownership by handing over a
clod of dirt.131 This thing-ownership metaphor is conventionally
summarized in Blackstone’s talismanic quotation that private property is
“ that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.” 132 Similarly, the idea of private property as a
“ legal thing,”  which arises in part because ownership has no intrinsic form,
has a lineage as ancient as the image of property as a “ physical thing.”
Fees, life estates, easements, and leases all represent complex legal things
distinct from physical things.133
In defining “ private property,”  the Supreme Court has long recognized
that it does not receive guidance from the text of the Constitution,134 a
130. For criticism of the conventional historical view of a period of absolutist control over
property, see Gordon, supra note 15, at 96, who observes: “ What strikes the backward-looking
observer as curious is simply this: that in the midst of such a lush flowering of absolute dominion
talk in theoretical and political discourse, English legal doctrines should contain so very few
plausible instances of absolute dominion rights.”
131. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 15; F.W. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2
L.Q. REV. 481 (1886).
132. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Blackstone’s views were rather less
absolute. Together with other lawyers and lay people of the day, Blackstone was aware of the
limits to the physicalist idea of private property. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra at *212-15
(discussing the law of trespass); id. at *217-18 (stating that when an owner wants to do something
vexing to a neighbor, “ it is incumbent on him to find some other place to do that act, where it will
be less offensive” ); see also Rose, supra note 15, at 603 (discussing Blackstone’s more nuanced
conception of property); Ellickson, supra note 37, at 1362, n.237 (“ Blackstone . . . would have
admitted that his sentence . . . was hyperbolic. His treatise explicitly discussed, for example, a
variety of legal privileges to enter private land without the owner’s consent.” ).
133. See also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *20 (considering incorporeal hereditaments
to be things despite awareness that “ [t]heir existence is merely in idea and abstracted
contemplation” ); ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 138-39 (explaining Blackstone’s view that
property included intangible interests and incorporeal hereditaments). As one commentator has
noted, “ ‘If you can think about something which is attached to something else without thinking
about what it is attached to, then you have what is called a legal mind.’”  Thurman W. Arnold,
Criminal Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1930) (quoting
Thomas Reed Powell).
134. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Justice Stewart wrote what has
become the Court’s paradigmatic position on finding the correct definition of property: “ Property
interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law . . . .”  Id. at 577.
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document that once mentions and nowhere defines the term.135 Instead, the
Court relies primarily on state law and background conceptions,136 which in
turn incorporate shifting property metaphors such as thing-ownership.
From pre-Constitution days through the end of the nineteenth century,
the Court only mandated compensation when the government completely
took physical things.137 Fragments of physical or legal things were not
protected as private property. For example, in Transportation Co. v.
Chicago,138 the Court stated: “ [A]cts done in the proper exercise of
governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property,
though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be
a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision.” 139 Similarly, in
the Legal Tender Cases,140 the Court wrote that the Takings Clause “ has
always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not
to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has
never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that
indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.” 141
Although superseded in property theory and constitutional
decisionmaking, the thing-ownership metaphor continues today as a theme
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“ [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” ). The Takings Clause is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). While the
Constitution mentions “ private property”  once, it mentions “ property”  several other times,
including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which reads “ nor shall any person
be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due process of law,”  U.S. CONST. amend. V, and Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads “ nor shall any State deprive any person
of . . . property, without due process of law,”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (“ Nor as a
general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the several States, possessed of residual
authority that enables it to define ‘property’ in the first instance.” ); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. FED.
479, 482 (1969) (noting that courts refer to state law to define “ property”  in condemnation
proceedings by the United States).
137. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) (“ The original understanding of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was clear on two points. The clause required
compensation when the federal government physically took private property, but not when
government regulations limited the ways in which property could be used.” ).
138. 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
139. Id. at 642.
140. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
141. Id. at 551. Arguably, the earliest modification in the Court’s approach came in Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872), in which a company acting under state authority
flooded private land. The Court observed: “ It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result,
if . . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely . . . because, in the narrowest sense of that
word, it is not taken for the public use.”  Id. at 177-78. The operative issue in Pumpelly may not
have been economic value per se, but rather that the flooding worked “ directly,”  by contrast with
the Transportation Cases where it worked “ indirectly.”  Pumpelly remained an anomaly for
several generations, while the Legal Tender approach was dominant. Nevertheless, the modern
Court has used the case to support reconceptualizing property in terms of value. See Treanor,
supra
 note 137, at 795 n.74 (discussing these cases).
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in popular understanding.142 Under this view, the boundaries of old-
fashioned private property are relatively transparent. It is easy to think of a
house or a field or a farm as a thing because resources defined on this scale
can be put to productive use.143 By contrast, a “ right to use a square inch for
philosophizing on Tuesdays”  does not appear to be a thing because this
fragment does not correspond to an ordinary use of land.144 The problem
with the thing-ownership metaphor is that it does not help identify
boundaries of complex governance arrangements and modern intangible
property.145
2. Bundle of Legal Relations
The metaphoric shift from thing-ownership to bundle of relations can
be traced to the late 1800s.146 Though its modern version is usually
attributed to Wesley Hohfeld, he never mentions a “ bundle of rights.” 147
On the other hand, he did develop the now standard idea that property
comprises a complex aggregate of social and legal relationships made up of
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities.148 This vision contrasts with
“ the simple and nonsocial relation between a person and a thing that
Blackstone’s description suggested.” 149 The Hohfeldian view moved
142. Bruce Ackerman explains much of Supreme Court takings doctrine by contrasting the
“ Ordinary Observer’s”  understanding of physical things with the observer’s uncertainty regarding
“ social property.”  ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 99-100. Alexander argues, however, that the
Ordinary Observer also was always familiar with ideas of social property, such as legal things and
legal relations. See Gregory Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1548
(1982).
143. The scale of productive use generally tracks the things that society recognizes as private
property. See Michelman, supra note 8, at 9 (“ Private property requires rules governing the
composition of allowable ownership claims—or, as it might be described, for ‘packaging’
marketable goods into legally cognizable objects of ownership.” ); see also infra Section IV.D.3
(discussing scale).
144. Michelman, supra note 8, at 9-10.
145. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 8, at 679 n.259 (noting the existence of a “ Brady Bunch
anticommons” ); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 698 (discussing the anticommons problem
in biomedical research).
146. The earliest use of the term “ bundle of rights”  appears to be from John Lewis, in his
1888 book, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain: “ The dullest individual among the people
knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights.”  See ALEXANDER,
supra
 note 31, at 322 & 455 n.40 (quoting Lewis); see also J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights”
Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 n.8 (1996) (tracing the metaphor).
147. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 319.
148. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 1-4 (1936).
149. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 321. Even in Blackstone’s day, people recognized that
private property also comprises “ legal relations,”  though this view was a less salient dimension
for fragmenting resources. For example, rules permitting entry on another’s land in an emergency
always tempered the most absolute ownership. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at *212-14.
HELL02.DOC 04/02/99 8:53 PM
1192 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1163
quickly from legal theory into the 1936 Restatement of Property and from
there into mainstream scholarship and judicial decisionmaking.150
For example, the American Law of Property defines private property to
be “ an aggregate of legal relations which has economic or sale value if
transfer be allowed.” 151 Similarly, conflating rights with goods, a standard
economic definition states: “ With private property, two persons may
exchange rights to goods on whatever terms they mutually accept. The
exchange . . . is unrestricted in the sense that any person who prefers some
other mixture . . . can ask for it. . . . In the open market, property rights can
be privately reshuffled and exchanged . . . .” 152 Nevertheless, as Part II
demonstrated, Anglo-American law restricts private property to a few
allowable forms, each bounded by restraints on fragmentation.153 The
pervasive presence of boundary rules challenges legal and economic
theories that suggest unstructured fluidity to private property. Instead, the
overwhelming evidence suggests that the notion of an open-ended bundle of
property rights is wrong.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon154
 marks the beginning of the Court’s
dramatic shift away from thing-ownership (and its built-in boundaries)
toward the bundle metaphor (and its more diffuse boundaries).155 Justice
150. Since its first adoption by the Court in the early 1940s, the bundle metaphor has been
making upward progress in property cases to near ubiquity. On the crudest empirical note, a
January 1998 Lexis search shows that the phrase “ bundle of rights”  appears in four state and
federal cases before 1940. Between 1940 and 1960, 133 cases use the term. Over the next 20
years, 246 more cases appear. Since 1980, 775 cases have used the term. While these figures give
a sense of the metaphor’s rise, they should be interpreted with caution because they miss cases
that do not use the precise search terms, include some cases that use them in an unrelated sense,
and do not control for the secular rise in published opinions. See also Penner, supra note 146, at
713 n.8 (describing the rise in use of this metaphor).
151. 6 ALP, supra note 21, § 26.1 n.1; see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note
148, §§ 1-4 (adopting the Hohfeldian definition of property); Grey, supra note 22, at 69
(criticizing the modern “ bundle of rights”  perspective).
152. ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, PRICING AND SOCIETY 7 (Institute of Econ. Affairs, Occasional
Paper No. 17, 1967). Amplifying this definition, Richard Posner writes: “ Some economists,
indeed, use the term property right to describe virtually every device—public or private, common
law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal—by which divergences
between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 53 (5th ed. 1998); see, e.g., Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property
Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16 (1973); Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich,
Introduction
 to THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-9 (Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar
Pejovich eds., 1974) (offering standard economic definitions of property).
153. Rudden quotes a range of great jurists on the point: Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “ new
and unusual burdens cannot be imposed on land.”  Rudden, supra note 62, at 244. L.C. Brougham
said, “ There are certain known incidents to property and its enjoyment . . . . But it must not
therefore be supposed that interests of a novel kind can be devised . . . .”  Id. B. Wilde
commented: “ It is a well settled principle of law that new modes of holding and enjoying real
property cannot be created.”  Id.
154. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
155. For discussions of Mahon, see Joseph F. DiMento, Mining the Archives of Pennsylvania
Coal: Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 396 (1990); Lawrence M. Friedman, A
Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in Context, 4 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (1986); E.F.
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Holmes’s majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal represents the view “ that
property is properly viewed as value, not physical possession, and that the
Takings Clause should therefore protect more than physical possession.” 156
This new view disregarded earlier constitutional understandings and
launched the Court on its modern struggle to protect an increasing number
of fragment types as private property.
A generation later, in United States v. General Motors,157 the Court
explicitly adopted the unbounded Hohfeldian perspective for the first time:
It is conceivable that [“ property” ] was used in its vulgar and
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the
citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it
may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the
group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical
thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact,
the construction given the phrase has been the latter. . . . The
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the
citizen may possess.158
Immediately after General Motors, however, the Court retreated in United
States v. Willow River Power Co.,159 writing that, “ not all economic
interests are ‘property rights’; only those economic advantages are ‘rights’
which have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized
may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to
compensate for their invasion.” 160 Through the combination of General
Motors
 and Willow River Power, the Court framed the debates on the
boundaries of private property, but these debates then lay dormant for
another generation. The Court’s full adoption of the bundle metaphor is of
quite recent vintage,161 and it comes just as the metaphor is losing its place
in property theory.
While the modern bundle-of-legal relations metaphor reflects well the
possibility of complex relational fragmentation, it gives a weak sense of the
“ thingness”  of private property. Conflating the economic language of
entitlements with the language of property rights causes theorists to
collapse inadvertently the boundaries of private property. As long as
Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REV. 287 (1986); and Carol M. Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
156. Treanor, supra note 137, at 802.
157. 323 U.S. 373 (1944).
158. Id. at 377-78 (footnote omitted).
159. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
160. Id. at 502.
161. Oddly, the Court in Lucas claims that its takings jurisprudence “ has traditionally been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State’s power over,
the ‘bundle of rights’ that they acquire when they obtain title to property.”  Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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theorists and the Court rely on the bundle-of-legal-relations metaphor, they
need some analytical tool to distinguish things from fragments, bundles
from rights, and private from nonprivate property. It may be time to
introduce a metaphor that better expresses the boundaries of new limited-
access and limited-exclusion ownership forms.162
B. Boundaries and Property Categories
In practice, as Part II demonstrated, private-law property boundaries
keep people from maintaining too many overlapping rights of use in a
commons and too many rights of exclusion in an anticommons. Property
theorists, however, have only recognized the commons/private half of this
continuum. This Section expands on my earlier work by arguing that
property theory should recognize the anticommons/private boundary. The
payoff from correcting the asymmetry in property theory comes in Part IV,
where the boundary principle helps unknot confused constitutional
decisionmaking.
1. The Commons/Private Boundary
The dichotomy of property categories is longstanding in property law
and theory.163 In modern bundle-of-rights terms, Frank Michelman has
defined commons property as “ a scheme of universally distributed, all-
encompassing privilege . . . that is opposite to [private property].” 164
Similarly, modern economic analysis of property has “ tended to classify
ownership status into the categories all and none, the latter being termed
‘common property’—property that has no restrictions placed on its use.” 165
162. As the bundle-of-rights image waxes in judicial decisionmaking, it is waning in property
theory. In separate conversations, Gregory Alexander suggested that a new metaphor is due, and
Brian Simpson argued that the time has come for a rigorous philosophical analysis that takes apart
Hohfeld and Honoré. See also Penner, supra note 146, at 819 (“ I believe in giving dead concepts
[such as the bundle of rights metaphor] a decent burial.” ).
163. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 52-53 (1990) (dissecting the assumptions
and contradictions in conventional property narratives that obscure the move from commons to
private property).
164. Michelman, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasis added).
165. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 71 (1989) (emphasis
added). Economic theorists of property have detailed the mechanisms by which people create
private property from commons resources. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution
of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975) (discussing
western land); Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
350-53 (1967) (discussing fur trappers); John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the
California Gold Rush, 20 J.L. & ECON. 421 (1977) (analyzing gold mines). Demsetz suggests that
private property emerges to internalize externalities when technological, population and other
pressures strain the capacity of common resources. See Demsetz, supra. But he misses the
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According to these definitions, by capturing common fish, foxes, or oil, an
individual signals the conversion of a thing to private property in a way that
others recognize.166 The simple dichotomy implies that a resource crosses
some
 boundary when it moves from commons to private property, but it
tells us little about either the particular contours of that boundary, or about
the range of private property forms that exist in the world (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2. THE SIMPLE PROPERTY THEORY DICHOTOMY
Moving beyond the simple dichotomy reveals that the term
“ commons”  itself covers a wide range of ownership forms. Commons
resources may be arranged along a continuum from open-access to limited-
access, with sole ownership as the boundary.167 In an open-access commons
such as the ocean or the air, everyone owns a right to use the resource. The
government may destroy open-access rights of use without compensating
owners; without, that is, crossing the boundary into a “ taking”  of private
property. When a regulation closes access to an ocean fishery and then
issues fishing quotas, or stops a factory from polluting and sells emissions
certificates, the government has wholly taken privately-owned rights of
possibility that government policies, market failures, and individual preferences may cause excess
fragmentation.
166. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (resolving the ur-fox-capture dispute);
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 76 (1985)
(suggesting that the rule-of-capture signals notice to others of one’s intent to convert a resource to
private use). It is difficult to imagine a commons in which property remains common even after an
individual appropriates it. See Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract
Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980) (considering the possibility); see also Heller, supra
note 8, at 675-76 (same). Even on the high seas, an individual may be able to call upon the power
of a state to protect a private right of use against pirates who take the notion of commons property
to its logical extreme. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987) (finding that states have universal jurisdiction to “ define and prescribe
punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern,
such as piracy” ).
167. See Ellickson, supra note 37, at 1322 (distinguishing open, horde, and group access in
his typology of land ownership).
  Open    Sole
 Access      Ownership
A  B   C etc. A  B  C etc.
      Commons Private Property
HELL02.DOC 04/02/99 8:53 PM
1196 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1163
use.168 Yet people generally do not believe, and the Constitution would not
support the claim, that private property was taken when such regulations
prevent resources from being wasted in a tragedy of the commons. Such
regulations are seen as creating rather than destroying private property.
On the other hand, in a limited-access commons, a bounded group
controls a resource. People often view rights in a limited-access commons
as each comprising private property. A few children, for example, may
jointly inherit a parent’s house. Anti-fragmentation mechanisms, such as
partition rules, allow owners to create separate private property and do not
allow the government to destroy the cotenancies without compensation.169
The hard cases for determining the boundary between private and
commons property occur when there are not clear decisionmaking rules or
institutions that can aggregate individual preferences and put resources to
productive use. This decisionmaking breakdown may occur, for example,
when a large, indeterminate, or informal group of owners controls a
resource in a limited-access commons. On the boundary itself, lay intuitions
and expectations tip towards neither the limited-access nor the open-access
outcome. When a legislature acts to avoid a tragedy of the commons in such
a case, what factors should a court consider in deciding whether private
property was taken? By including limited-access forms, Figure 3 makes
visible one set of boundary problems.
FIGURE 3. THE CONTINUUM FROM OPEN ACCESS TO SOLE OWNERSHIP
The familiar paradigm of private property appears when a sole owner,
A, controls all use rights to a productively-scaled resource. In an open-
access commons, owners A, B, C, etc. each have rights to use, and the
168. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b-7651o (1994) (creating tradeable pollution
allowances in sulfur dioxide); Peter Passell, U.S. States To Allot Fishing Rights in Coastal Waters
to Boat Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1991, at A1 (noting reallocation of fishing rights).
169. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 114. When uses irreconcilably conflict,
owners can divide their cotenancies into sole ownership. However, physical “ partition in kind”
can create uneconomically small lots. To avoid a tragedy of the anticommons, “ partition by sale”
allows judges the alternative of selling the undivided resource and then dividing up money among
co-owners. Id.; see also supra note 13.
  Open  Limited        Sole
 Access   Access   Ownership
A  B   C etc. A  B  C etc.  A   B   C  etc.
Commons     Private Property
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resource is not necessarily scaled for productive use. A tragedy of the
commons may occur when some social or technological change increases
the intensity of each rightholder’s use.170 In the intermediate, limited-access
case, a bounded number of owners, here A and B, can each use the resource,
neither can exclude the other, and either can exclude outsiders. The larger
box that A and B inhabit suggests that they may create a limited-access
commons to exploit gains from increasing the scale of resource use, but
there is no necessary correlation between the number of commons owners
and the scale of resource use. Whether the rights of A and B are on the
commons or private side of the boundary depends on many familiar factors
in takings analysis, including whether the internal governance rules of the
limited-access commons generally prevent the occurrence of a tragedy of
the commons.
2. The Anticommons/Private Boundary
The familiar continuum of property forms recognizes the existence of a
boundary where people fragment private property into a commons with too
many users, but not where they fragment it so that there are too many
excluders. Parsing the boundaries of private property requires both
commons and anticommons categories because people can waste resources
equally through overuse and underuse. As Part II has shown, a range of
modern property doctrines respond to the problem of over-fragmentation
and to the waste that may occur when too many people may block each
other from using a productively-scaled resource.
Recapitulating Figure 1 from the Introduction, Figure 4 incorporates
anticommons property and shows how commons and anticommons
property together bracket the ways that private property can fragment. If
people fragment private property so that too many people can exclude each
other, then the resource may be wasted in a tragedy of the anticommons.171
170. This shift in intensity of use parallels the story Demsetz tells. See Demsetz, supra note
165, at 350-53. According to the standard theory of the shift, the switch to private property also
encourages conservation of the resource.
171. See Heller, supra note 8, at 677.
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FIGURE 4. THE BOUNDARIES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
Like commons property, anticommons property may also be arrayed
along a continuum from full to limited exclusion.172 In a full-exclusion
anticommons, where everyone can block everyone else and no one can use
the valuable resource, the likelihood of a tragedy of the anticommons is
relatively high, and resistance to government rebundling of rights without
compensation may be low. However, boundary problems are more complex
in a limited-exclusion anticommons where a closed number of owners can
block each other from using a resource. In such cases, as with condominium
owners blocking changes to covenants, owners hold the resource in
anticommons form vis-à-vis each other, but as private property vis-à-vis the
outside world. Owners who cannot reach agreement to use such a resource
may nevertheless expect compensation for a regulation that abolishes their
rights to exclude.
Paralleling the dilemma on the commons side, the difficult cases
involve finding the boundary of viable private ownership beyond which a
tragedy of the anticommons is likely to arise and persist. Bargaining
breakdowns seem particularly likely when a large, indeterminate, or
informal group of owners can exclude each other from using the resource.
The problem for lawmaking is to acknowledge that such a boundary exists
and then to determine when to characterize ownership as falling on the
private or anticommons side of the boundary.
C. Defining the Boundary Principle
Despite the ambiguity that the dominant metaphors encourage, theorists
have recognized that private property is delimited by some boundaries.
Some theorists discuss these boundaries using the language of alienability,
or of alienability versus marketability. Others rely upon Michelman’s
opposition of “ nonintervention”  and “ internalization biases.”  Each of
172. See id. at 669 n.218.
  Open  Limited        Sole  Limited     Full
 Access   Access   Ownership        Exclusion        Exclusion
A  B   C etc. A  B  C etc.  A   B   C  etc. A B  C etc.  A   B   C  etc.
Commons     Private Property      Anticommons
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these property terms describes an aspect of the boundary rules identified in
Part II.
1. Previous Definitions
The most common approach to bounding private property has been
through the language of alienability. By the nineteenth century, alienability
had become “ the overriding topic of concern to American property
lawyers.” 173 While nineteenth-century scholars justified increasing
alienability to root out feudal remnants, scholars today typically claim that
unbounded alienability helps to ensure efficient resource use.174
Even after centuries of constant use, or perhaps because of it,
alienability is a poorly defined term that often obscures rather than
highlights boundaries. Does it increase or decrease alienability to allow an
owner to divide her fee simple absolute into a fee simple determinable
followed by a possibility of reverter? Allowing fragmentation increases
alienability for the current owner, and possibly for future owners if the
fragmented interests are alienable. If one focuses on an individual’s current
freedom to alienate a fee simple and assumes that fragments are easily
tradeable, then boundary rules may appear as anachronistic targets for
property reformers. On the other hand, such fragmentation decreases
alienability from a social standpoint because trading future interests can be
costly and future owners do not have access to unfragmented fee simples.
Thus, it is rarely clear whether alienability refers to a current or future
owner’s freedom to dispose of undivided ownership. One consequence of
this ambiguity is that boundary rules are sometimes shoehorned into the
conventional framework by being labeled as “ rules preventing indirect
restraints on alienation.” 175
173. ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 120. Property lawyers in this era were concerned with
overthrowing feudal remnants in the law through which the landed classes could retain dead hand
control of their estates, and, in James Kent’s words, “ leave an accumulated mass of property in
the hands of the idle and the vicious.”  4 KENT, supra note 69, at 19; see also ALEXANDER, supra
note 31, at 146 (discussing Kent). Lawrence Friedman notes that during the first part of the 19th
century, “ fear of land monopoly and land dynasties haunted the lawmakers,”  LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 240 (2d ed. 1985), and that in the latter part of the
century, “ the dominant theme of American land law was that land should be freely bought and
sold.”  Id. at 412.
174. See 6 ALP, supra note 21, § 26.1 (“ Since an early date in the history of the English
common law it has been thought socially and economically desirable that the owner of a present
fee simple . . . should have the power to transfer his interest.” ). According to the American Law of
Property, the main social and economic objections to direct restraints on alienation are that if such
restraints were valid, over time, resources would likely be wasted because they would be taken out
of the stream of commerce, improvements would be discouraged, wealth might become more
concentrated, and creditors potentially could be misled. See id. § 26.3.
175. See, e.g., CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 82-85 (conflating discussion of the
Rule Against Perpetuities with the rules against restraints on alienation). This nomenclature is odd
because anti-fragmentation rules operate by limiting individuals’ current choices regarding
HELL02.DOC 04/02/99 8:53 PM
1200 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1163
A more nuanced way to describe the same problem is through the
opposition of alienability and marketability.176 Here, alienability refers to an
individual’s freedom to fragment and transfer ownership today, while
marketability refers to the rules that keep property available for future
productive use by limiting individual choice. While these oppositions track
well the divergence between individual choice and social welfare, they too
miss both the mechanisms that unify pro-marketability doctrines and the
continuum of property relations.
Michelman has offered a persuasive analysis of the economic
mechanisms that underlie anti-fragmentation doctrines. He suggests that the
ideal type of private property formally contains a principle of “ market-
facilitating composition.” 177 This principle comprises both a “ non-
intervention bias”  analogous to the idea of alienability and an
“ internalization bias”  that tracks marketability.178 Michelman argues that
these two biases together create a simple, formal decision rule necessary to
characterize a private-property regime. According to this rule: “ [T]he state
may leave composition unregulated; and insofar as the state ever does
regulate composition, it does so only by rules that conform to the principle
of internalization—that is, the rules are designed with a view to
accommodating coordination through small-number transactions.” 179 This
market-facilitating principle abstracts away from real world property
regimes that, as Michelman notes, “ abound[] in restrictions on
decomposition of titles.” 180
While he usefully describes the economic mechanisms of the boundary
principle at a high level of abstraction, Michelman is not concerned with
the practical scope of real-world fragmentation problems. Moreover, he
does not look beyond economic explanations to the “ thingness”  of private
property, and to the psychological mechanisms that animate these persistent
popular conceptions. The nonintervention/internalization opposition, like
alienability. By contrast, rules preventing direct restraints, which are a relatively minor part of the
law, promote alienability by current owners. See 6 ALP, supra note 21, § 26.3. Direct restraints
include the disabling form, “ O grants Blackacre to A, and A may not sell” ; the forfeiture form, “ O
to A, but if A tries to transfer, then to B” ; and the promissory form “ O to A, and A promises not to
transfer.”  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 32, at 223-24.
176. See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 145 (“ Alienability is not necessarily the same as
marketability.” ); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 474; cf. Sterk, supra note 81, at 644-59
(suggesting the contrast between “ freedom of contract”  and “ freedom from freedom of contract”
as a way of discussing boundary rules in the servitudes context).
177. Michelman, supra note 8, at 20. He notes that this principle necessarily applies to
reassignment as well as to the initial acquisition of private property. See id. at 17-20.
178. Id. at 20.
179. Id. at 19.
180. Id. at 15. Following Michelman, Ellickson notes that “ [t]o deter destructive
decompositions of property interests, the Anglo-American legal system has developed a complex
set of paternalistic rules. . . . Rules that govern the interpretation and termination of sub-fee
interests also tilt against creation and continuation of interests ‘repugnant to the fee.’”  Ellickson,
supra
 note 37, at 1374.
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the alienability/marketability distinction, misses the complex governance
relations within modern property forms, the emerging divergence between
the private and public law of property, and the distinct commons/private
and private/anticommons boundaries. Building on Michelman’s work, I
understand the boundary principle as recognizing both the market-
facilitating mechanisms that Michelman identifies and the noneconomic
factors (justice-based, community-building, psychological, historical) that
help constitute modern understandings of private property.
2. A New Approach
The boundary principle can be defined as a practical, real-world
corollary to sole ownership.181 Sole ownership refers to the relationship
between an owner or group of owners of a resource and the external world.
The boundary principle concerns primarily the internal relations among
multiple owners of a single resource. When resources are so fragmented
that internal governance mechanisms predictably fail and multiple owners
cannot productively manage the resource with respect to the external world,
then the ownership fragments are no longer usefully protected as private
property.
In a transaction-costless world free of any cognitive biases, boundary
rules would be less crucial because people could bargain perfectly to
assemble fragmented resources and put them to their highest valued uses.182
Boundary rules would play no role in improving allocative efficiency. They
would instead have solely distributional consequences (which are important
in their own right). However, as Part II has shown, it is because we live in a
world of transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive failures,183 that
resources may be wasted even though no individual fragment is strictly
inalienable.184
Anti-fragmentation mechanisms respond to predictable bargaining
failures that lead owners to waste jointly controlled resources. To be
efficient as an economic institution and useful as a theoretical construct,
private property requires the practical mechanisms of the boundary
181. In distilling the formal elements of private property, Michelman notes the fundamental
role of sole ownership: “ The rules must allow that at least some objects of utility or desire can be
fully owned by just one person.”  Michelman, supra note 8, at 5.
182. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960); cf. R.H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988) (recognizing the centrality of
transaction costs).
183. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 385-91 (1991) (discussing the roles of
framing and wealth effects in undermining Coasian bargains).
184. See Heller, supra note 8, at 676.
HELL02.DOC 04/02/99 8:53 PM
1202 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1163
principle just as much as it requires the formal possibility of sole
ownership.
3. From Property Law to Constitutional Theory
As Part II demonstrated, the private law of property has developed a
series of practical rules that sweep away excessively fragmented rights of
use and of exclusion by fixing boundaries. Until recently, the familiar
metaphor of thing-ownership reinforced these common-law property
boundaries. The private law of property, property theory, and constitutional
decisionmaking aligned to police boundaries.
However, the recent intersection of the new bundle metaphor with the
old commons/private dichotomy has created an asymmetry in property
theory. To overcome tragedies of the commons, regulations
uncontroversially abolish valuable use-rights. But similar regulations that
would overcome tragedies of the anticommons now prove more
controversial, particularly for the Supreme Court. If the Court were to
recognize the boundary principle in the private law and to update its
understanding of property theory, perhaps its takings jurisprudence would
be better than “ a secret code that only a momentary majority of the Court is
able to understand.” 185 Valuable rights to exclude, like rights to use, should
not necessarily be viewed as private property, despite the direction the
Court has been taking recently.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLES OVER PROPERTY BOUNDARIES
To the extent the Court’s takings jurisprudence is informed by
utilitarian concerns, recent cases are paradoxical: They undermine the
usefulness of private property as an economic institution and distinct
constitutional category. By highlighting the economic costs of the Court’s
asymmetric approach to fragmented ownership, this Part encourages the
185. See Heller & Krier, supra note 3, at 997 (abstract). As a string cite in every law review
takings discussion invariably and colorfully points out, the Court has made this area of law a
mess. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just Compensation Cases, 34
RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 244 (1982) (“ a farrago of fumblings which have suffered too long from a
surfeit of deficient theories” ); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1333, 1333 & n.1 (1991) (“ one of the most frustrating areas of law” ); Jed Rubenfeld,
Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 (1993) (“ engulfed in confusion” ); Joseph L. Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971) (“ resistant to analytical
efforts” ). The organizing principle for this ubiquitous cite remains elusive: friends, the famous, or
just pithy quotations? Is there a market to provide quotable quips, like the advertising blurbs from
professionally enthusiastic movie reviewers?
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Court to make explicit the nonutilitarian values that may be driving its
takings jurisprudence.186
Unlike the private-law tradition, which bounds fragmentation across the
property continuum, the Supreme Court fails to grasp the importance of
boundaries on the anticommons side. The first three Sections present a
novel framework for analyzing takings cases based on whether the Court
characterizes a regulation as predominantly affecting a physical thing, legal
thing, or legal relation. The Court’s jurisprudence suggests this tripartite
framework, which in turn tracks private law and property theory approaches
to fragmented ownership. While the following discussion categorizes cases
according to the Court’s primary emphasis and tone, the cases nevertheless
overlap; any single case potentially could be recast to fit into any of the
three categories. The final Section explores some preliminary issues that the
Court might consider as it constitutionalizes the boundaries of private
property.
A. Physical Boundaries: From Cable Boxes to Trust Accounts
1. Loretto
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.187
 is the modern
paradigm for analyzing regulations that abolish private ownership of a
physical fragment. In Loretto, the Court evokes the inchoate intuitions of
the thing-ownership metaphor to devise the ostensibly simple boundary rule
that, when a regulation results in “ permanent physical occupation,”  a
taking occurs “ without regard to whether the action . . . has only minimal
economic impact on the owner.” 188 The Court’s approach will, I expect,
prove unstable because it fails to recognize the necessity of defining the
private/anticommons boundary and because of lurking ambiguities in the
bundle-of-rights metaphor. Whatever property principle Loretto vindicates,
186. As Michelman argues, recent takings cases “ are a manifestation of the difficulties faced
by the Court in trying to keep faith with American constitutionalism’s aspiration to reconcile
private property (or, more generally, limited government) with democracy.”  Frank Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625 (1988). This Part uses takings doctrine to explore
the law and theory of fragmented ownership, rather than to examine takings law as part of the
larger fabric of American constitutionalism or to offer a general theory of takings. For the
beginnings of such a theory, see Heller & Krier, supra note 3. In conversation, Jed Rubenfeld
notes that takings scholarship has generally had a property, rather than a constitutional, focus. For
an example of a Constitution-oriented approach, see Rubenfeld, supra note 185, which
reinvigorates the Public Use Clause. See also Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of Takings, 46 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 586, 590 (1996) (“ [A]s of 1987, the Takings Clause posed only a very limited
threat to the state’s regulatory power. Specialists in public law subjects like constitutional law and
administrative law could largely afford to ignore it.” ).
187. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
188. Id. at 434-35.
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it does not serve any plausible efficiency goals reflected in the boundary
principle.
The underlying technical problem in Loretto is that creating a cable
television network requires attaching a tiny box to numerous buildings.189
Multiple landlords can each deny access to relatively low-value physical
fragments of box space and thereby prevent creation of a high-value
network. While no single building is crucial to the network, the transaction
costs of bargaining with and compensating multiple owners could well
exceed the private gains from creating the network. A default legal regime
that requires bargaining could create an anticommons with too few cable
services.
The regulation at issue in Loretto190 responded to this intersection of
existing law and technological opportunity. According to the legislature,
each tiny physical fragment where the cable was attached to a landlord’s
building was not, in itself, private property. By overcoming a potential
tragedy of the anticommons, the regulation was consistent in form with the
ordinary workings of the boundary principle.
In Loretto, the Court straddles the two main property metaphors in a
way that misses the boundaries implicit in both: “ [W]hether the installation
is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is
bigger than a breadbox.” 191 The Court invokes the thing-ownership
metaphor to argue that, (1) because the “ permanent physical occupation”
that occurred when Pumpelly’s whole parcel was flooded in 1872
constituted a taking, therefore, (2) by analogy, the “ permanent physical
occupation”  of enough space on a landlord’s building to house a tiny cable
box in 1982 is a taking as well.192 But the Pumpelly Court would not have
reached the Loretto Court’s holding, because the earlier Justices used the
thing-ownership metaphor to distinguish physical things from physical
fragments.
After reforming Pumpelly’s version of thing-ownership, the Loretto
Court switched to the expansive General Motors version of the bundle
metaphor.193 Conflating physical fragments with bundles, the Loretto Court
wrote: “ To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical
property, it effectively destroys each of [the rights in the General Motors
bundle].” 194 The Court, in a jumble of metaphors, argued that: “ [T]he
government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of
189. Id. at 421-22.
190. Id. at 424.
191. Id. at 438 n.16.
192. Id. at 427; see also supra note 141 (discussing Pumpelly).
193. See 458 U.S. at 435 (“ ‘Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the
rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’”  (citing United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373,
378 (1945))).
194. Id.
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property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every
strand.” 195 This physicalist language—“ chopping through the bundle” —
suggests the means by which the Court is attempting to distinguish this case
from ordinary regulations that affect value. What would have been an
unprotected physical fragment under the old thing-ownership metaphor
becomes a complete, were private property thing in Loretto.
The conventional holding that observers take from Loretto is that
private property has no downward boundary when fragmented into ever
smaller physical things.196 While the dissent noted the “ curiously
anachronistic”  quality of the strained analogy back to Pumpelly,197 the
Court’s categorical rule does not mesh with either old or new conceptions
of private property.198 Given modern conceptions of property as value, and
given that the value taken by the cable box is de minimis,199 the regulation
in Loretto probably would not require compensation under Michelman’s
utilitarian calculus200 or Bruce Ackerman’s Ordinary Observer test.201
Indeed, on remand, after bouncing the case around for years, the New York
courts found “ just compensation”  was not likely to be more than the one
dollar that the statute had originally mandated as “ reasonable
compensation”  for the intrusion of the cable box.202
So what is at stake in this case? If such fragments are protected as
private property, and each owner can get a day in court to contest
condemnation valuations, then the transaction costs of negotiating with
owners and paying trivial amounts of compensation could deter legislatures
from acting to overcome similar tragedies of the anticommons. Loretto
could deter legislatures from continuing the ordinary common-law process
of boundary creation following technological change. Instead of deterring
efficient regulation, the Court could have recognized that private property
has boundaries on the anticommons side of the continuum and then
195. Id.
196. See Rubenfeld, supra note 185, at 1084 (stating that Loretto “ boldly extended the
physical-invasion rule” ).
197. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., John J. Constonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for
the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 529 (1983) (evincing unease with the “ anachronistic”
and “ aberrational”  categorical rule in Loretto).
199. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“ Precisely because the extent to
which the government may injure private interests now depends so little on whether or not it has
authorized a ‘physical contact,’ the Court has avoided per se takings rules resting on outmoded
distinctions between physical and nonphysical intrusions.” ).
200. In dissent, Justice Blackmun writes that: “ [A] takings rule based on such a distinction is
inherently suspect because ‘its capacity to distinguish, even crudely, between significant and
insignificant losses is too puny to be taken seriously.’”  Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1227 (1967)).
201. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 22.
202. Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (App. Div. 1987); see generally
Heller & Krier, supra note 3, at 1007-09 (criticizing Loretto and offering a better approach).
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balanced its competing values more explicitly, just as it ordinarily does on
the commons side of the property continuum.
2. Phillips
In a recent case, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,203 the Court
extended the Loretto analysis by analogy to interest earned on lawyers’
trust accounts. Lawyers routinely hold money in trust for clients, and pay
over accrued interest to clients when the trust funds are large enough to
earn net income after expenses. When the trust amounts are so small (or
held for such a short time) that a client would earn no net interest, however,
states instruct lawyers to hold those funds in Interest On Lawyers’ Trust
Accounts (IOLTA). By pooling small accounts, IOLTA produces
substantial aggregate income that states use to fund legal services for low-
income individuals.204
Like the fragmented property interest in Loretto, the interest-earning
capacity of small trust accounts has no economic value to the client, but has
substantial value when the state aggregates the resource to a more efficient
scale of use. Nevertheless, according to the Court,
We have never held that a physical item is not “ property”  simply
because it lacks a positive economic or market value. . . . [P]roperty
is more than economic value; it also consists of “ the group of rights
which the so-called owner exercises in dominion of the physical
thing,”  such “ as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.” 205
The Court makes clear that its conception of private property extends
beyond economic value, though this conception makes it difficult to
understand how to read the Takings Clause as a whole. If just compensation
for taking such private property would be zero, then what is at stake in the
case? The dissent raises this question in criticizing the Court for
announcing “ an essentially abstract proposition.” 206
The Court appears to be defending the claim that fragments of physical
things, or economic interests that can be closely analogized to physical
things, have no boundary on the anticommons side of the continuum,
regardless of how fragmented they become. Perhaps this position furthers
203. 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). See generally Heller & Krier, supra note 3, at 1013-22
(discussing the role of Phillips in the law of takings).
204. See id. at 1928-29; see also Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Making Something out
of Nothing: The Law of Takings and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 7 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. (forthcoming 1999) (detailing the facts and reasoning of Phillips).
205. Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1933 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. General Motors,
323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
206. Id. at 1934 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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an implicit liberty interest of owners or deters governments from redefining
property too much. But it appears to cut against an efficiency rationale for
private property. By deterring the government from achieving economies of
scale unavailable to owners of economically valueless fragments, the Court
ensures that resources are wasted in a tragedy of the anticommons.
Cabining fragmentation of valueless physical things should be an easy task,
but proves complex.
B. Legal Boundaries: From Air Rights to Beach Easements
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding fragments of legal things proves
even less coherent and sustainable than Loretto and Phillips. Margaret Jane
Radin has usefully labeled this group of “ legal thing”  cases under the
rubric of “ conceptual severance,” 207 and judges and scholars have
discussed the same question using the related nomenclature of the
“ denominator problem.” 208 With legal things, the flawed analogy to thing-
ownership is more attenuated. As a result, the Court has even less analytical
traction with which to formalize its intuitions and differentiate protected
property from unprotected fragments. In considering this problem, the
Court has oscillated between equally unsatisfactory ad hoc and formalist
approaches to the regulatory abolition of fragments of legal things.
207. As Radin notes:
[Conceptual severance involves] delineating a property interest consisting of just what
the government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that
particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus, this strategy hypothetically or
conceptually “ severs”  from the whole bundle of rights just those strands that are
interfered with by the regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes
those strands in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988); see also Michelman, supra note 186, at 1601
(noting that conceptual severance might also be called “ entitlement chopping” ).
Radin also includes “ physical thing”  cases such as Loretto within her conceptual severance
category. See Radin, supra, at 1676. I believe this inclusive reading undermines the analytic force
of her insight. The Court has a visceral reaction to discrete physical things distinct from its
treatment of conceptual severance in the legal thing cases. Conversely, a legal thing case such as
Nollan
 could be narrowly read as effecting a form of a “ permanent physical occupation.”
Michelman, supra, at 1608 (quoting Lawrence Means, Motives and Takings: The Nexus Test of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 253-63 (1988)).
208. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992)
(noting that “ the rhetorical force of our ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ rule is
greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’ against which
the loss of value is to be measured” ); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171,
1179-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the “ Denominator Problem” ); Michelman, supra note 200,
at 1192 (noting that “ [t]he difficulty [of determining a diminution in value] is aggravated when
the question is raised of how to define the ‘particular thing’ whose value is to furnish the
denominator of the fraction” ).
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1. Penn Central
Often the Court can re-conceive a regulation to eliminate completely a
discrete, traditional legal thing from an owner’s larger fee simple.209 The ad
hoc approach of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York210
offered the Court one way to resolve the boundary problem while avoiding
the unsatisfying attempt to create a bright-line rule. The question there was
whether a regulation took private property when it limited the ability of
Penn Central to build above its train station. Are these air rights a distinct
legal thing that are completely taken or are they unprotected fragments of a
larger thing? If the air rights are themselves private property, then the
government may not be able to overcome the tragedy of the commons that
results because each owner can destroy historic landmarks. The majority
suggested a plethora of ad hoc factors that may be considered to bound
property211 and then rejected the view that the air rights fragments were
themselves private property.212
Applying this ad hoc approach allows the Court to call on widely
shared popular intuitions about property boundaries that are difficult to
reduce to formulas, but that appear reasonably consistent over time.213 On
the other hand, critics may argue that the ad hoc approach reduces to the
unprincipled claim that fragments are private property only when the Court
says so.214 However, cases since Penn Central have moved away from “ ad
hocery” 215 and vague standards back toward bright-line rules that purport to
avoid policymaking. As Michelman writes:
Permanent physical occupation, total abrogation of the right to pass
on property, denial of economic viability—all of these may be
regarded as judicial devices for putting some kind of stop to the
209. For example, in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court characterized
low-level overflights not as physical occupation by military planes of the farmer’s land, but as a
taking of an easement in air above. See also Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel v. United States,
260 U.S. 327 (1922).
210. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
211. See id. at 124-26.
212. Compare id. at 130 (“ ‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated.” ), with id. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“ [T]he Court has frequently
emphasized that the term ‘property’ as used in the Taking Clause includes the entire ‘group of
rights inhering in the citizen’s [ownership].’”  (quoting United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S.
373 (1945))).
213. See Levmore, supra note 185, at 1333 n.1 (“ [L]arge parts of takings law may be
predictable in the sense that experienced observers will know whether a particular governmental
intervention is or is not likely to cause courts to require that the government compensate burdened
parties.” ).
214. See Michelman, supra note 186, at 1626 (characterizing Richard Epstein’s view of ad
hoc reasoning to be “ usurping democracy as we fall into the hands of unbridled judicial power.” ).
215. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697 (1988).
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denaturalization and disintegration of property. They are formulas
having both the feel of legality and the feel of resonance with
common understanding of what property at the core is all about.216
While the Court’s approach to evaluating fragments of legal things may
have “ the feel of legality,”  the new bright-line rules also cut off an
important avenue for bounding fragmentation, and therefore, they
paradoxically increase rather than decrease the “ denaturalization and
disintegration”  of property.
2. Nollan
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission217
 is an example of the
Court’s more recent approach to analyzing regulations and government
actions that abolish fragments of legal things from a bundle of rights. In
exchange for permission to rebuild his beach bungalow, Nollan was
required to cede what the Court termed an “ easement”  to allow the public
to pass along his private beach.218 The right to pass along the beach was
conceptualized as a complete legal thing, a lateral easement that had been
completely taken.
Alternatively, continued private ownership of the beach easement could
have been viewed as creating a tragedy of the anticommons, with each
owner blocking the optimal social level of use of beaches valued now for
beachcombing rather than for hauling out fish. For example, some state
courts have found that, under state public trust or customary rights
doctrines, the public holds an easement to cross along dry sand beaches.219
Had California found such a public easement to exist generally under state
law, that legal thing would have trumped every beachfront owner’s takings
claim, including Nollan’s. Under such a regime, the easement would have
never been purchased by the landowner; beachfront access would be a
separate, state-owned legal interest. The conclusory labeling of Nollan’s
lateral easement as a complete legal thing owned by him perhaps reflects
concern with the way Nollan was singled out by the state, rather than
216. Michelman, supra note 186, at 1628.
217. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
218. Id. at 841, 842 (“ California is free to advance its ‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes,
by using its power of eminent domain for this ‘public purpose,’ but if it wants an easement across
the Nollans’ property, it must pay for it.”  (citation omitted)).
219. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); see
also
 David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1996) (“ Oregon is generally credited with resuscitating
the doctrine of customary easements as applied to public rights of access to the beach.” ); Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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anything intrinsic about lateral easements. The Court’s formal approach
inadvertently obscures the boundaries of property.220
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis221
 considers the
same class of issue—whether the “ support estate”  in a physical pillar of
coal is on the private or anticommons property side of the boundary—and
decides the ad hoc factors cut against a finding of private property.222
Keystone
 recapitulates the same debate that took place sixty-five years
earlier in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon223 but comes to the opposite result.
Similarly, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,224 the Court asks whether the period during which the city forbade
the church from rebuilding should be characterized as a discrete “ lease”  or
as a part of the larger ownership bundle.225
In Nollan, Keystone, and First English, the Court dealt unpersuasively
with the issue of whether a regulation impermissibly took a complete legal
thing or only a fragment of a larger legal thing. It is difficult to imagine
how the Court will create a sustainable, formal approach that relies on
distinguishing among protected legal things and unprotected fragments,
particularly when the test turns so transparently on linguistic framing rather
than on explicit tradeoffs among competing values. Every regulation can be
cast as the complete taking of some “ legal thing,”  characterized perhaps as
an easement, servitude, or lease.226 When is a legal thing salient? What legal
220. As an aside, I remain agnostic about whether the government should have to compensate
a beachfront owner like Nollan. There are two distinct issues to consider. First, does
fragmentation create a beachcomber’s tragedy of the anticommons? Here it appears the answer is
yes. Second, should the government pay compensation if it abolishes the offending property right
fragments? Some states find customary rights or public trust doctrines that work their formalistic
magic to clear the beachcomber’s path; other states find that if the public wants access, it must
pay for the right. The split in state law suggests why Nollan presents a close issue. My intention is
to show that the one-way ratchet of fragmentation may impose hidden costs on society and that
recognizing property boundaries can help focus discussion on the competing social values at
stake. By contrast, the Nollan Court’s labeling exercise does not advance the argument or provide
much guidance for future close cases.
221. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
222. Compare id. at 498 (“ The 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of
property for takings law purposes.” ), with id. at 517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“ There is no
question that this coal is an identifiable and separable property interest.” ).
223. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Compare id. at 414 (“ [The regulation] purports to abolish what is
recognized . . . as an estate in land . . . .” ), with id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“ The rights of
an owner as against the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his property into
surface and subsoil.” ).
224. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). This case is perhaps better read more narrowly as one concerning
takings remedies than as one expanding the boundaries of legal things.
225. Compare id. at 319 (1987) (conceptually severing a temporary regulation into a taking
of a term of years), with id. at 334-35, (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to a finding of a
temporary taking).
226. Commenting on Radin’s idea of conceptual severance, William A. Fischel notes:
An important implication of such a conception is . . . the identification for judicial
protection of every stick in the bundle of property rights or, in economists’ jargon,
every differentiable term of the property rights function. A regulatory burden on one
HELL02.DOC 04/02/99 8:53 PM
1999] Boundaries of Private Property 1211
things are on the private property side of the boundary? The formalistic
approach of labeling fragmented legal things “ private property”  fails to
create defensible property boundaries and appears likely to dissolve back
into ad hocery.227
C. Relational Boundaries: From Sale to Devise
If private property is a bundle of legal relations, then a bare legal
relation must be something less. But what is it? The Court’s jurisprudence
becomes most perplexing when it moves to policing fragmentation of legal
relations, a distinct line of cases that scholars have not previously isolated.
As several Justices have recognized, the Court’s decisions in these cases are
flatly incompatible with each other. On a deeper level, to avoid recognizing
the boundaries of private property, the Court has instead embarked on a
hopeless task by attempting to single out key legal relations.
1. Andrus
The back-to-back 1979 cases of Andrus v. Allard228 and Kaiser Aetna v.
United States229
 introduce the debate over bare legal relations and the
difficulty of finding the boundary between private and anticommons
property. Andrus rejects the idea that a single legal relation, the “ right to
sell,”  is itself private property,230 while Kaiser Aetna protects the bare
“ right to exclude.” 231 All legal relations are equal, but the Court’s
jurisprudence suggests that some legal relations are more equal than others.
In Andrus, a regulation banned the sale of already-collected eagle
feathers as part of a scheme to help protect living eagles and avoid a
aspect of a parcel, such as a restraint on alienation or withdrawal of air rights, rises
automatically to a full taking of property under conceptual severance.
William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1581, 1592 (1988).
227. As Michelman observes, “ the recent outcroppings of formality [are] not . . . harbingers
of a possible second coming of the liberal conception in American constitutional law, but
symptoms of the historical impossibility of consummating such an event.”  Michelman, supra note
186, at 1625.
228. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
229. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The dispute in this case arose after Kaiser Aetna dredged its inland
pond and connected it to navigable waters. The government then argued that these improvements
made the pond itself navigable and therefore created a public right of access. See id. at 168. But
for its subsequent and repeated use by the Court as a legal relations case, Kaiser Aetna could more
naturally fit under the physical thing or legal thing categories in my framework: “ [T]he
imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of
the privately owned marina. And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in
property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.”  Id. at 180 (emphases added) (citations
omitted).
230. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67-68.
231. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
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tragedy of the commons.232 The effect of taking the “ right to sell”  strand
was to diminish the value of existing eagle feathers, even though the
owners retained the right to exclude, possess, transport, devise, or donate
their feathers.233 The Court held that “ the denial of one traditional property
right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner
possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety.” 234 Andrus could be read to stand for the proposition that particular
nonphysical fragments of legal relations are not private property.235 This
position seems necessary if the government is to have the power to avoid a
tragedy of the commons (and protect eagles).
Kaiser Aetna, in which the federal government claimed a navigation
easement in a privately-dredged marina, represents the opposite view.
While the facts of the case seem to refer to the fragmenting of legal things,
Kaiser Aetna
 has become the beachhead for eliminating the boundaries of
nonphysical legal relations at the anticommons end of the property
continuum. The case is often cited for the proposition that “ the ‘right to
exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation.” 236 This is an odd statement, relying on questionable
authority.237
It is difficult to imagine how the Court will be able to tease out which
relations form the core of private property and which can be regulated
without implicating the Takings Clause. Private property undeniably exists
when some of the standard incidents are missing,238 even the “ right to
232. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 58.
233. See id. at 66.
234. Id. at 65-66. In Andrus, as in Lucas, when the Court speaks of key “ traditional”  legal
relations, this is a jurisprudence of recent vintage.
235. The Lucas Court suggests that it can distinguish Andrus on the grounds that regulation
of personal property receives less Takings Clause protection than real property. See Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
236. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80 (citation omitted). As an aside, the case may have
come out differently had the Court been reviewing a decision finding a navigational servitude
under state law. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a state
constitutional requirement that prevents shopping center owners from excluding picketers).
237. The Court ignores the usual sources found in state law. See Stephen J. Massey, Note,
Justice Rehnquist’s Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541, 547-48 (1984). (arguing that the
assertion of the universality of a “ right to exclude”  is inconsistent with the Court’s “ usual
insistence that property claims must be established by reference to positive state law” ). Instead,
the Court cites to two appellate decisions, United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d
1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975), and United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961), and to the
less sweeping statement in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in International News Service v. Associated
Press
 that “ [a]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it.”  248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at
180 n.11.
238. See Heller, supra note 8, at 663-64 & n.192.
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exclude.” 239 Scholars have challenged the presence of one or another of the
incidents of property in the core list.240 For example, in contrast with the
Court’s position, Honoré omitted the “ right to exclude”  from his list of
standard incidents of ownership and criticized theories of property that
focus too much on exclusion.241 On the other hand, he did include the “ right
to the capital”  as a key incident.242 While no scholar has a formal status as
an arbiter of core rights, Honoré’s approach, and the criticism it has
engendered, calls the reasoning in Andrus and Kaiser Aetna into question.
The Court’s hunt for key legal relations is hopeless. It is an attempt to
formalize the distinction between private and nonprivate property along a
non-salient dimension. The boundary exists at the point where a regulation
overcomes a salient anticommons tragedy, a practical boundary that
requires attention to competing social and political values.243 Private law
routinely recognizes and attempts to define this boundary in practice, but
the Court’s search for key relations denies it in principle.
2. Hodel
Hodel v. Irving,244 and its companion case Babbitt v. Youpee,245 are at
once a natural continuation of the Court’s hunt for key relations and a
worrying departure from previous cases. Though little discussed by legal
scholars, these two cases represent striking instances where the Court found
that a bare, nonphysical legal relation can be private property.246 The
Court’s unanimous decision in Hodel belies the case’s difficulty. A review
239. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (holding that farmer-employers do
not have the right to exclude aid agencies from coming onto land to assist migrant workers). As
early as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the classic case upholding
comprehensive zoning, the Court held that many sticks can be removed from the bundle without
that constituting a taking of private property.
240. See Heller, supra note 8, at 663-64 (discussing the debate).
241. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A.G. Guest
ed., 1961) (defending his approach as “ an attempt to redress the balance”  in property theory and
discussing exclusion as part of a right to possess); see also Massey, supra note 237, at 547-48 &
n.42 (discussing the contradiction between the Court’s holding and Honoré’s theory).
242. Honoré, supra note 241, at 113.
243. See Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 220 (1993) (arguing that “ [r]ather than asking whether a particular right
constitutes a core strand in the traditional bundle of property rights, the Court should more
forthrightly focus on [the social aspects of property]” ).
244. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). For an analysis of Hodel, see Ronald Chester, Is the Right To
Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?: The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 SW. U. L.
REV. 1195 (1995).
245. 519 U.S. 234 (1997). The underlying factual issues are the same in Hodel and Babbitt.
246. These cases can be framed as comprising two distinct kinds of fragmentation. The facts
predominantly concern the fragmentation of Native American allotment land into overlapping
low-value tenancies-in-commons, that is, fragmentation into small legal things. The Court’s
analysis, however, focuses on fragmentation of legal relations, that is, whether Congress can, in
certain circumstances, eliminate the right to devise from the bundle of rights.
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of drafts of the decision and internal Court correspondence, available in the
public papers of Justice Marshall, reveals that a split Court initially decided
to come out on other grounds and wrestled for months with a range of
competing views.247
Hodel
 and Babbitt graphically illustrate how regulatory mistakes that
defeat the boundary principle can create anticommons property,248 and how
difficult it is subsequently to rebundle those property fragments. In the
1880s, Congress enacted a series of Land Acts that broke up Native
American reservations and allotted communal lands to individual Native
Americans.249 In order to protect Native Americans from white settlers, the
lands were held in trust by the United States and “ often could not be
alienated or partitioned.” 250 In practice, land could be transferred only
through devise or intestacy.251 As the Court noted in Hodel:
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous
for the Indians. . . . The failure of the allotment program became
ever clearer as successive generations came to hold the allotted
lands. . . . Because the land was held in trust and often could not be
247. See The Papers of Thurgood Marshall, Box 412 (unpublished manuscripts reproduced
from the collections of the Library of Congress, on file with author). The draft opinion circulated
on Nov. 3, 1986 by Justice Stevens would have held section 207 invalid on due process grounds,
based on the reasoning in Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). This approach gathered little
support and elicited draft concurrences from Justices O’Connor and Scalia, see Memorandum
from Justice O’Connor to Justice Stevens (Nov. 3, 1986) (on file with author) (“ Your draft
opinion in this case goes off on a ground not raised by the parties . . . .” ); O’Connor draft
concurrence, (Mar. 11, 1987); Memorandum from Justice Scalia to Justice Stevens (Nov. 4, 1986)
(on file with author) (“ I share Sandra’s concerns . . . .” ).
Initially, Justices Powell and Rehnquist were inclined to find that section 207 was not a
taking. As Justice Powell wrote:
At Conference I was tentatively inclined to [find section 207 not to be a taking].
A clear majority at Conference voted to affirm, but there was considerable diversity of
opinion as to the basis of the Court’s decision. Letters from Sandra and Nino indicate
that differences continue to exist.
As I am not at rest, I will await further writing before deciding what to do.
Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Stevens (Nov. 5, 1986) (on file with author); see also
Memorandum from Justice Powell to Chief Justice Rehnquist (Feb. 19, 1987) (on file with
author); Memorandum from Justice Powell to Justice Scalia (Feb. 26, 1987) (on file with author);
Memorandum from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Scalia (Mar. 3, 1987) (on file with author).
Justices Rehnquist and Powell signed on first to Justice Scalia’s concurrence and then, in
April 1987, to Justice O’Connor’s draft majority opinion. In May 1987, Justice Scalia also signed
on after Justice O’Connor toned down references to, and reliance on, Andrus.
248. See Heller, supra note 8, at 685-87.
249. See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 615-16 (1982 ed.)
(“ [A]llotment is a term of art in Indian law, describing either a parcel of land owned by the
United States in trust for an Indian (‘trust’ allotment) or owned by an Indian subject to restriction
on alienation in favor of the United States or its officials (‘restricted fee’ allotment).” ); Heller
supra
 note 8, at 685 (noting that individuals received 160 acres and heads of households received
320 acres);
250. Hodel, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987).
251. See id. Here the terms of the trust operated to create an anticommons in contradiction to
the usual role of the trust as an anti-fragmentation mechanism.
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alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew and grew
over time.252
Reforms finally ended further allotment, but they could not solve the
problem of the millions of acres that already had been allotted and
continued to fractionate.253 By the 1980s, according to the Court, the
average tract in one region had 196 owners and the average owner had
undivided interests in fourteen tracts.254 The Court noted that the
fractionation had become “ extraordinary” 255 by the time Congress passed
the 1983 Indian Land Consolidation Act.256 Section 207 of this Act began
consolidating these overly fractionated cotenancies by providing for low-
value allotment interests to escheat to the tribe upon the owner’s death. In
analyzing the regulation, the Court followed the opening it had created in
Andrus
 and Kaiser Aetna and framed the question as whether the right to
devise a fractionated interest in undivided allotment land is itself private
252. Id. at 704. As early as 1928, Congress realized that the program was not working and
“ [g]ood, potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst great poverty, because of
the difficulties of managing property held in this manner.”  Id. at 708. In trying to reform the
allotment program in 1934, one Congressman noted:
[T]he administrative costs become incredible. . . . On allotted reservations, numerous
cases exist where the shares of each individual heir from lease money may be 1 cent a
month . . . . The Indians and the Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a
meaningless system of minute partition in which all thought of the possible use of land
to satisfy human needs is lost in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping.
Id.
 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 11,728 (1934) (statement of Rep. Howard)).
253. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 708; see also John H. Leavitt, Hodel v. Irving: The Supreme
Court’s Emerging Takings Analysis—A Question of How Many Pumpkin Seeds per Acre, 18
ENVTL. L. 597, 612 (1988) (“ Fractionalization creates an enormous administrative burden for the
BIA.” ); Suzanne S. Schmid, Comment, Escheat of Indian Land as a Fifth Amendment Taking in
Hodel v. Irving: A New Approach to Inheritance?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 741-42 (1989)
(“ The fractionation of individually owned Indian trust or restricted land represents one of the
outstanding problems in Indian law.” ).
254. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 712. One particularly egregious tract, Tract 1305 of 40 acres,
produced $1080 in annual rents, was valued at $8000, and cost the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
$17,560 annually to find and pay the 439 owners and manage the property. See id. at 713. In
1934, John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs noted:
[T]he Indian Service is forced to expend millions of dollars a year. The expenditure
does not and cannot save the land, or conserve the capital accruing from land sales or
from rentals. . . . For the Indians the situation is necessarily one of frustration, of
impotent discontent. They are forced into the status of a landlord class, yet it is
impossible for them to control their own estates; and the estates are insufficient to yield
a decent living, and the yield diminishes year by year and finally stops altogether.
Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 of the House Comm. on Indian Affairs,
73d Cong. 117-18 (1934), cited in Petitioner’s Brief at 10, Babbitt v. Youpee, 518 U.S. 1050
(1996). On Tract 1305, two-thirds of the owners received less than one dollar in annual rents and
one-third received less than a nickel, while the smallest share amounted to a penny once in 177
years. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713.
255. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 712.
256. Pub. L. No. 97-459, tit. II, 96 Stat. 2515, 2517 (1983) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 2206 (1994)).
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property.257 Allotment owners in Hodel arguably retained more rights than
did the eagle dealers in Andrus. In particular, allotment owners “ retained
full beneficial use of the property during their lifetimes as well as the right
to convey it inter vivos.” 258 Nevertheless, the Court wrote:
In Kaiser Aetna . . . we emphasized that the regulation destroyed
“ one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property—the right to exclude others.”
Similarly, the regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of
the right to pass on a certain type of property—the small undivided
interest—to one’s heirs.259
In 1984, while the Hodel litigation was pending, Congress made several
changes to section 207 in an attempt to ensure its constitutionality.260 The
amended version changed the threshold at which the fractionated interests
escheated, but it did not make any substantial change that would affect the
Court’s analysis. In Babbitt, the Court, with little new analysis, held that
Congress’s new attempt was as flawed as the regulation rejected in
Hodel.261 Where does this leave Andrus? Three Justices concurred in Hodel
solely to say Andrus is still good law and to limit Hodel to its facts;262
another three Justices concurred solely to state the opposite and limit
Andrus
 to its facts.263 There the matter lies.
257. In deciding Hodel, the Court could have arrived at the same outcome it reached without
creating a new level of protection for bare legal relations. Following Causby, the Court could have
relied on its “ legal thing”  jurisprudence. The Court brings this approach to mind when it
analogizes section 207 to an old-fashioned remainder interest: “ [T]he right to pass on valuable
property to one’s heirs is itself a valuable right. Depending on the age of the owner, much or most
of the value of the parcel may inhere in this ‘remainder’ interest.”  Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715. To
value this so-called remainder interest, the Court suggests 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(f) (Table A)
(1986), which shows that the value of a remainder interest when a life tenant is age 65 is
approximately 32% of the whole. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715.
258. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715.
259. Id. at 716.
260. See Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519
U.S. 234, 240 (1997) (listing three relevant amendments to section 207).
261. Babbitt, 519 U.S. at 235 (“ The narrow revisions Congress made to § 207, without
benefit of our ruling in Irving, do not warrant a disposition different than the one this Court
announced and explained in Irving.” ).
262. The entire concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, states:
I find nothing in today’s opinion that would limit Andrus v. Allard to its facts. Indeed,
largely for reasons discussed by the Court of Appeals, I am of the view that the unique
negotiations giving rise to the property rights and expectations at issue here make this
case the unusual one. Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court.
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
263. Justice Scalia’s entire concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Powell, reads:
I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately to note that in my view the present
statute, insofar as concerns the balance between rights taken and rights left untouched,
is indistinguishable from the statute that was at issue in Andrus v. Allard. Because that
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The Court’s review of section 207 starkly shows the point at which the
private law and the public law of property diverge. To overcome a tragedy
of the anticommons, the private law of property routinely develops anti-
fragmentation mechanisms that prevent, and sometimes abolish, valuable
privately-held interests.264 Hodel represents the most striking case in which
the Court has invoked the Takings Clause to defeat the normal operation of
legislative reforms that create boundary rules. Hodel denies the existence of
boundaries; the Court engages in a search for the key strands from the
bundle of legal relations that public law will label “ private property.”  In
the cause of strengthening private property, the Court instead entrenches a
tragedy of the anticommons.
D. Constitutionalizing the Boundaries
The task of this Article has been to show that well-functioning private
property exists within constantly shifting boundaries on the property
continuum. Precisely pinning down those boundaries is a difficult problem
that the Supreme Court has begun to address, albeit imperfectly. While the
Court easily accepts that private property is bounded by the commons, it
misses the anticommons boundary. Instead, the Court is pursuing
increasingly baroque and formalistic distinctions to cabin private property.
A more sustainable path would recognize that not all valuable privately
held property rights are ipso facto private property. This Section notes
several issues that the Court could consider in constructing a practical test
for bounding private property.265
1. The Private Law Tradition
Perhaps the familiar cognitive bias to value things more if they are in
hand than in prospect accounts for the divergence between the private and
takings law approaches. Assuming this bias exists, the divergence might
make sense if private law doctrines prevent fragmentation while the few
regulations that the Court has considered abolish owners’ existing
fragments. But this cognitive distinction cannot explain the Court’s
comparison is determinative of whether there has been a taking, see Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, in finding a
taking today our decision effectively limits Allard to its facts.
Id. at 718 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
264. See supra Section II.B.
265. While developing such a practical test is outside the scope of this article, Jim Krier and I
venture a new approach to takings law. See Heller & Krier, supra note 3. Rather than trying to
define “ private property”  as such, our approach responds more directly to the purposes of the
Takings Clause. By uncoupling matters and methods of deterrence from matters and methods of
distribution, we aim to develop a law of takings more workable than the mess that now exists.
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approach. The private law often abolishes existing fragments. Indeed, every
government regulation could be framed as abolishing someone’s discrete
physical thing, legal thing, or legal relation. Framing the issue in terms of
initial endowments does not help.
Part II showed that the problem of framing boundaries does not appear
so intractable in the private law regardless of whether the doctrine prevents
or abolishes a fragment. The private law seems to adjust reasonably easily
to social and technological changes that alter the productive scale of
resource use on either the commons or anticommons side of the property
continuum. As an initial matter, then, the first step toward developing a
constitutional boundary test for “ private property”  is to notice that the
private law has a tradition and method that the Court has been undercutting.
A recent D.C. Circuit case, DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC,266 illustrates how the
courts could use a more subtle understanding of private law and property
theory to bound private property. In this case, the FCC divided satellite
channels among six broadcasters and told them that if more channels
became available in the future, they would receive them on a pro rata basis.
Instead, when a block of channels opened up, the FCC decided to auction
them as a block to create a new competitor. Although the court decided the
case on other grounds, it approved the FCC’s anti-fragmentation argument
that existing broadcasters should not be able to vindicate their interests in
receiving fragments of new satellite capacity. Abolishing the fragments was
not a taking of private property. The court wrote:
In order to aggregate sufficient channels to support a viable
[satellite] service, these permittees would have to negotiate some
form of agreement for joint operations . . . or else work out a
system of channel swaps to consolidate assignments. The process
necessary in either case is often a time consuming one that is not
always successful, which is further complicated by the time
required for Commission consideration and approval . . . .267
By contrast, denying the fragments to the existing broadcasters and
auctioning them to a new competitor in a coherent bundle, “ obviate[s] the
need for reaggregation and allow[s] the auction winners to proceed directly
to acquisition or construction of satellites and operation of their systems
without having to negotiate with other permittees or engage in several
rounds of administrative processing.” 268 The court was right to approve the
FCC’s decision not to create anticommons property; validating the
broadcasters’ expectations by labeling them as private property would make
266. 110 F.3d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
267. Id. at 827 (quoting the FCC order).
268. Id. (quoting the FCC order).
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little economic sense, nor does it seem necessary on some independent
assessment of justice.
2. Takings v. Due Process Approach
Kaiser Aetna
 and Hodel are not the only possible approaches to the
boundary problem for legal relations. As one alternative, the Court could
have relied on its due process jurisprudence,269 an approach Justice Stevens
proposed in his early draft of and subsequent concurrence in Hodel and his
dissent in Babbitt.270 Texaco v. Short271 exemplifies this approach. In
Texaco, the Court upheld an Indiana statute that retroactively extinguished
mineral interests unused for twenty years.272 Similarly, in United States v.
Locke,273 the Court analyzed the destruction of a property fragment not
through the bundle of rights prism or the Takings Clause, but instead in due
process terms: “ Legislatures can enact substantive rules of law that treat
property as forfeited under conditions that the common law would not
consider sufficient to indicate abandonment.” 274 Perhaps the Court could
allow Congress to solve the fractionation problem by an intrusive regulation
that escheats fragmented allotment interests to the tribe unless owners
269. “ Just compensation”  and “ due process”  as applied to property have had different
jurisprudential trajectories. See Massey, supra note 237, at 542-45. But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985):
Under the proper analysis all rights are, as it were, fundamental. Neither the due
process clause nor the takings clause draws any distinction among the types of property
interests they protect. All such interests are treated as a piece and all are subject to the
unified application of the police power rules.
Id. at 143. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998), a central disagreement among
the Justices concerns whether to characterize a regulation as affecting property under the Takings
Clause or the Due Process Clause. See Heller & Krier, supra note 3, at 1024-25 (noting the
Justices’ conflicting approaches).
270. Justice Stevens offers a way to review regulations that aim to overcome a tragedy of
anticommons property:
The federal interest in minimizing the fractionated ownership of Indian lands—and
thereby paving the way to the productive development of their property—is strong
enough to justify the legislative remedy created by § 207, provided, of course, that
affected owners have adequate notice of the requirements of the law and an adequate
opportunity to adjust their affairs to protect against loss.
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 246 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
272. Id. at 529. (The state has the power to “ condition the retention of a property right upon
the performance of an act within a limited period of time. . . . [A]s a result of the failure of the
property owner to perform the statutory condition, an interest in fee was deemed as a matter of
law to be abandoned and to lapse.” ); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 729 (1987) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (citing Texaco, 454 U.S. at 529).
273. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
274. Id. at 106 n.15. These rules, however, are only reasonable if they afford sufficient notice
to the property owners and a reasonable opportunity to comply. See id.
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regularly register them.275 Protecting property through the Takings Clause is
not the only way to protect valuable, privately held property interests.
This past Term, the Court revisited these fundamental disagreements
regarding the nature of private property and the question of when to invoke
takings or due process protections. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,276 the
question presented was whether Eastern’s property was taken when
Congress retroactively required it to fund health care benefits for retired
coal miners. A four-member plurality found that the imposition upon the
company of a general obligation to pay money constituted a taking of
private property to be analyzed under the Takings Clause.277 A four-
member dissent noted that the case involved no “ interest in physical or
intellectual property, but an ordinary liability to pay money.” 278 The dissent
concluded that “ there is no need to torture the Takings Clause to fit this
case. The question involved—the potential unfairness of retroactive
liability—finds a natural home in the Due Process Clause.” 279 The dissent
found no due process violation.
The pivotal decision is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Kennedy
deemed the Takings Clause inapplicable, but invalidated the retroactive
legislation on due process grounds. In criticizing the plurality, Justice
Kennedy noted that the “ one constant limitation has been that in all of the
cases where the regulatory taking analysis has been employed, a specific
property right or interest has been at stake.” 280 Following this statement,
Justice Kennedy cited a remarkable, undifferentiated list that mixes together
all of the Court’s regulatory taking cases.281 Together, these cases provide
an “ outer boundary for application of the regulatory takings rule [that]
provides some necessary predictability for governmental entities.” 282
Justice Kennedy’s argument may have been even more persuasive had he
separated the regulatory takings cases into the three strands proposed in this
Article—physical things, legal things, and legal relations—and explored the
boundaries to private property that appear in the private law, as detailed in
Part II.
275. For example, it would have been constitutionally uncontroversial for Congress to
instruct the BIA to charge owners the administrative costs of managing the trust lands, an amount
that would often dwarf the value of the allotment and would lead to massive and rapid abandoning
of fragments back to the tribe. It is an oddly formalistic approach that allows the BIA to solve the
fractionation problem through burdensome administrative fees, but not by the less intrusive
method of eliminating devise of the least-valuable fragments.
276. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998).
277. See id. at 2153.
278. Id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 2155 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
281. See id.
282. Id.
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3. The Scale of Private Property
A final, more subtle problem, is how to determine when a salient
tragedy of the anticommons exists. Property often functions well as private
property on one scale of aggregation, but as an anticommons on another.
Indeed, this problem underlies and justifies the routine decision to use
eminent domain where private property is reasonably well functioning, is
more valuable in another scale of use, and cannot be collected for that use
because of holdouts by dispersed owners. In these cases, there may be a
tragedy of the anticommons at the level of the more valuable use, but there
is no debate that the fragments are each private property protected under the
Constitution.
To make the private/anticommons boundary salient, then, the Court
needs to be able to distinguish the anticommons fragments in Hodel from
the private property parcels in a case such as Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit.283
 In Poletown, each house functioned as private
property at the family level. But at the community level, fragmented private
ownership appeared to function as an anticommons, where each owner
could block General Motors from achieving what it claimed would be the
highest valued use of the land as new factory space. The lots in Poletown
were put to ordinary use as private homes, so they should be considered as
private property regardless of whether fragmented ownership creates a
tragedy of the anticommons at a different scale.284
How is Hodel different from Poletown? In both cases, owners hold
fragments that may be more valuable when bundled into a larger scale.
Nevertheless, the two cases may be distinguished along an intuitively-
plausible, but still theoretically-preliminary, axis. In Hodel, no owner can
make ordinary or even minimal productive use of the underlying resource.
The fractionated farms lie fallow, though it appears from the record that
Native American owners do not prefer this use.285 The interests in Hodel
have become so fragmented that their economic value derives primarily for
their use in blocking others. If the accounting costs of dividing payments
were not subsidized by the government, the leases would generate no net
revenue. Even if the fragments were to have some residual speculative
value, reconstituting them into sole ownership on any ordinary scale of use
seems impossible through private bargaining. If the government has to bear
283. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
284. Poletown may not be an example of a tragedy of the anticommons even at the
community level. There was a substantial question whether the switch to factory use improved
overall utility because the fair market value system of compensation misses the subjective and
community values destroyed by bundling. See JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY
BETRAYED (1989). The resemblance of the case to the English enclosures of Blackstone’s time is
striking.
285. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987).
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the transaction costs of aggregating these interests, it may in practice prefer
to let the resources remain fragmented and wasted.
By contrast, in Poletown, each owner can use each lot in an ordinary,
productive way as a single family home, even if each owner also can hold
out and block bundling at the community level. More generally, regulations
should be able to rescale ownership without being said to have taken private
property when ownership fragments do not function productively on an
ordinary scale of use. Thus, Hodel may have been wrongly decided if, on
reflection, it appears that Congress used its standard legislative approach to
bounding private property to avoid a salient tragedy of the anticommons.
This rationale explains why the legislature need not have compensated the
landowners in Hodel, but the Poletown case presents a compelling need for
compensation. Whether compensation is due depends not only on the
purpose of the government’s activity, but on the nature of the thing lost by
the plaintiff.
Determining an “ ordinary”  scale of use admittedly remains a thorny
problem. The gap between popular intuitions about ordinary uses and a
workable doctrinal test persists. A task of this Article has been to point out
that courts and legislatures should recognize that a salient distinction exists
between Hodel and Poletown. Pinning down the boundary between those
and related pairs of cases is perhaps a practical problem for old-fashioned,
common-law judges and not a theoretical task at all.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that private property is not a useful analytic concept
unless it can be practically bounded. For the most part, fragmentation
creates wealth. Self-interest ensures that people usually engage in cost-
justified fragmentation of their private property. But governments
sometimes create policies with perverse incentives, markets and informal
institutions sometimes fail, and people are prone to cognitive biases and
strategic behaviors that lead them to fragment resources too much. Over
many centuries, legislatures and courts have responded flexibly with anti-
fragmentation mechanisms that limit the costs of these failures. The
boundary principle is as much at the core of private property as the idea of
sole ownership.
Recently, the Supreme Court has begun undermining the benefits of the
boundary principle by labeling fragments of physical things, legal things,
and legal relations as private property. From an efficiency standpoint,
however, not all privately-held property rights should be protected as
private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular,
when resources are wasted in a tragedy of the anticommons, protecting
fragments of ownership does not serve the plausible economic goals of a
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private property regime. If protecting fragments serves competing values,
then the Court should make these values explicit and confront the tradeoffs
they engender.
